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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Biometric authentication systems provide alternative solutions to traditional methods 
that are based on knowledge (e.g. password) or physical tokens (e.g., smart card). Many 
studies now focus on getting high accuracy rates for biometric verification. However, 
with advances in technology, biometric data (e.g. fingerprint, face, iris) can be 
captured/sniffed, duplicated, modified, and then resubmitted in the same or in other 
applications that utilize the same biometric features. 
Watermarking techniques can be used effectively to protect the genuine ownership of 
biometric data, either to accept or reject. This thesis presents a proposal for a suitable 
and viable combination of a face recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique, 
namely a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 
combination, that will ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted in the face 
recognition system, which will then increase its level of security. The emphasis is on 
replay attack, which is recognizing and rejecting captured biometric data resubmitted 
into the system. 
The research begins with an analysis of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face 
recognition systems, and in particular with reference to the recorded threats on such 
systems. Biometric watermarking algorithms proposed by previous researchers within 
the face recognition environment are then studied, noting their proposed solutions to the 
said threats. This would then give a good idea towards a watermarking scheme to be 
proposed to enhance the security of face recognition systems, especially in terms of the 
authenticity of the data being transmitted. 
This proposed watermarking face recognition scheme is the main objective, which 
will be implemented in a PCA—DCT combination, followed by a check on all the 8 
vulnerable positions where data may be captured and/or resubmitted. All the results 
produced are positive, apart from a few situations that will have to be left for future 
work. Non degradation of the individual PCA and DCT systems due to the combination 
is also checked and experimented on, again with positive results. Finally, the robustness 
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of the watermarking scheme is experimented on to evaluate its resilience against 
attacks.  
The contributions from this research constitute a meaningful solution step to security 
problems associated with biometric techniques. The outcome of the research should also 
stimulate further research by opening up more research gaps in the area of combining 
biometric and watermarking techniques. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
Information technology (IT) has revolutionised the present world and largely 
influence the way we exchange information. From the low pace and costly books, 
newspapers and magazines, the discovery of computers and the internet simplifies and 
speeds up the process of acquisition, publication, as well as the exchange of information 
for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. What is more, the new era 
introduces a more flexible and cost effective communication channel using the latest 
digital transmission technologies.  However, the tremendous growth in IT is not without 
its demons as there are now security issues (Jain et al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2003; 
Mathivadhani et al., 2010), where the individual’s information is now at risk of being 
illegally accessed by unauthorised users, duplicated and manipulated (Lin, 2000). 
Recently, biometric technology in general, and face recognition in particular, has 
received significant attention. There are a number of reasons for this, the main one 
being its applicability in a wide range of commercial and law enforcement applications. 
The second important reason is the availability of possible solutions after almost 3 
decades of research in this area, which has led to considerable improvements in the 
level of maturity of current recognition systems (Zhao et al., 2003). This success 
extends the variety of applications based on face recognition to include applications 
such as video games, virtual reality, training programs, human-robot interaction, 
human-computer interaction, driver’s license, entitlement programs, smart card 
immigration, national ID, passports, voter registration, welfare fraud, TV Parental 
control, personal device logon, desktop logon, information security system security, 
database security, network and intranet security, internet access, medical records and 
law enforcement (e.g. suspect tracking and investigation), to name a few. However, the 
success of these systems is considered still limited and many applications are still far 
away from the capabilities of the human perception system. 
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Biometrics is a relatively new domain in information security technology (Jain et al., 
2002). It determines the identity of a person based on his/her biophysical features (e.g. 
face, fingerprint, palm-print, and iris), or behavior features (e.g. signature, voice, and 
gaits). Various biometric systems have been developed during the past few decades, such 
as automated fingerprint recognition systems (AFRS), iris recognition systems, and face 
recognition systems, have been successfully deployed in a wide range of applications, 
including access control, attendance control, customs checking and others. Compared 
with traditional token based security systems, biometric systems are much friendlier and 
more difficult to cheat because the biometric traits are unique to every person and are 
permanent throughout his/her life. 
Although biometric techniques often offer reliable methods for personal 
identification, biometric techniques do suffer from several security problems. Ratha et 
al., (2001) analyzed threats in biometric systems and listed them out into 8 vulnerable 
positions (refer to Figure 1.1), which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
An example of an attack may take place when the scanner captures the biometric traits 
and sends them to the feature extraction module for further processing. At this location, 
the transmission channel is vulnerable to several threats, such as eavesdropping attack, 
replay attack, man in the middle attack, and brute force attack. For example, during the 
raw data transmission between the said modules, the biometric traits can be intercepted 
and the attackers can ‘replay’ the biometric traits directly to the feature extractor and 
effectively bypass the scanner. Countermeasures to such attacks include transmitting data 
over encrypted channels, the use of symmetric or asymmetric keys, digital signatures, 
and Timestamp/Time to Live (TTL) tags. 
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Figure 1.1: Typical components of a biometric system and vulnerable positions for 
interception and resubmission of data 
Figure 1.1 depicts the components of a typical biometric system, where the biometrics 
data of the subject captured by a scanner/sensor is to be matched with one of the 
authorized objects stored in a database. The core component is made up of a feature 
extraction module and a matcher that compares the features extracted from the subject 
and those from an object. A match will result in an approval status sent to the application 
device, else a rejection. 
According to Ratha et al. (2001), there are attacks on a biometric system where data 
can be intercepted, manipulated, and then resubmitted into the system to achieve 
approval. In the case of a face recognition system, the sensor device is a scanner, and the 
object database is a facial database. More importantly, the figure 1.1 above identifies the 
vulnerable positions where data may be intercepted as well as resubmitted, namely the 8 
positions a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h. The figure also shows the possible types of data that can be 
intercepted and/or resubmitted. Measures to increase the level of security of biometric 
systems will have to secure these 8 positions, both in terms of blocking entry, as well as 
to ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted. 
Indeed, in order to attain a more widespread utilization of biometric techniques, an 
increased level of security of biometric data is necessary (Ratha et al., 2001). 
Cryptography and watermarking are among the possible techniques to achieve this. 
Watermarking involves embedding information into the host data itself, so it can provide 
security even after detection (the watermark attached to the host data), in particular 
against tampering (Sridhar, Sattar and Mohan, 2014).  
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Recently, researchers have proposed algorithms based on image watermarking 
techniques to protect biometric data (Ratha et al., 2000; Gunsel et al., 2002; Jain et al., 
2002; Jain and Uludag., 2003; Vatsa et al., 2004a; Kim et al., 2006; Salahi et al., 2008; 
Rajibul Islam et al., 2008; Sabu and Ann., 2011; Bahsal et al., 2012; Isa and Aljareh., 
2012; Kekre et al., 2015; Abdullah et al., 2015; Isa et al., 2016). In biometric 
watermarking, a certain amount of information, referred to as a watermark, is embedded 
into the original cover image using a secret key, such that the contents of the cover image 
are not altered. Some of these methods perform watermarking in the spatial domain 
(Gunsel et al., 2002; Jain et al., 2002; Jain and Uludag, 2003; Kim et al., 2006; Hoang et 
al., 2008; Yadav et al., 2011; Sabu and Ann, 2011; Zutao Zhang, 2011; Bahsal et al., 
2012), while other methods embed the biometric watermark in the frequency domain 
(Ratha et al., 2000; Vatsa et al., 2004a; Vatsa et al., 2007; Rajibul Islam et al., 2008; 
Salahi et al., 2008; Yan and Liu, 2010; Isa and Aljareh, 2012; Bedi et al., 2012; Behera 
and Govindan, 2013; Inamdar and Rege, 2014; Kekre et al., 2015; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Isa et al., 2016). 
A survey of the previous work listed has also shown that not all of the the 8 
vulnerable positions of biometric systems have been thoroughly covered or secured, and 
as such there is still research to be done in some areas, especially in securing the data 
transmitted against replay attack. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The main problem is to find a suitable combination of a face recognition algorithm 
and a watermarking technique, ensuring that the combination will not degrade the 
performance of the individual systems, with the main objective being to increase the 
level of security of the face recognition system at the 8 vulnerable positions where data 
may be intercepted and/or resubmitted, in particular in terms of the authenticity of the 
data being transmitted. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of this research is to propose a watermarked face recognition system that is 
well-protected at the 8 vulnerable positions, especially against replay attacks, while at 
the same time  maintain the face recognition rate and robustness against watermarking 
attacks (Median filter, Gaussian noise, JPEG compression and Salt & Pepper). 
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1.4  OBJECTIVES 
The problem statement leads to the following three research objectives, which will 
also define the main deliverables of this study: 
1) To propose a suitable combination of a face recognition algorithm and a 
watermarking technique, and that the combination will not degrade the 
performance of the individual systems. 
  
2) To propose a watermarked face recognition scheme that will ensure the 
authenticity of the data being transmitted in the face recognition system, in 
particular at the 8 vulnerable positions where data may be intercepted and/or 
resubmitted, and in doing so will increase the level of security of the face 
recognition system, 
3) To propose a watermarked face recognition scheme that is robust against 
watermarking attacks (mainly signal processing attacks) especially Median filter, 
Gaussian noise, JPEG compression and Salt & Pepper attacks to ensure that the 
watermark cannot be easily removed. 
1.5   METHODOLOGY 
This research begins with an analysis of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face 
recognition systems, and in particular with reference to the 8 threats that have been listed 
out by Ratha et al. (2001), Next, biometric watermarking techniques proposed by 
previous researchers within the face recognition environment are studied and classified 
according to their proposed solutions to the said threats.  
The literature survey would then give a good idea towards a watermarked face 
recognition scheme to be proposed to enhance the security of face recognition systems, 
especially in terms of the authenticity of the data being transmitted. This proposed 
watermarked face recognition scheme is a major target. 
Towards an implementation for validating the proposed watermarked face recognition 
scheme, the PCA (Principal Component Analysis) method, a holistic approach for face 
recognition, is chosen. For the watermarking system, the Least Significant Bits (LSB), 
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) techniques, 
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being representative of their respective approaches, are looked at to complement the 
PCA to enhance the level of security. An analysis is then carried out to show that the 
DCT performs the best, and a further analysis is carried out to ensure that the PCA—
DCT combination will not degrade the performance of the individual systems. 
The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme is then worked into the PCA—
DCT combination, followed by a verification on the 8 vulnerable positions (of Figure 
1.1) where data may be intercepted and/or resubmitted to ensure the authenticity of the 
transmitted data. From the 8 vulnerable positions, there are the 64 (8x8) possible 
situations, and it is found that some may not be relevant at all, many will be shown to be 
resolved (fully-protected), while the (few) remaining ones will have to be left for future 
work. The robustness of the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme will also be 
experimented on to evaluate its resilience against attacks. 
As an experiment for the validation of the proposal, the three combinations of 
PCA—LSB, PCA—DCT, and PCA—DWT are implemented and compared, and the 
results are analyzed and discussed. 
1.6  SCOPE 
In this study, only one face recognition algorithm is selected to combine with one of 
three watermarking techniques. Although this may seem quite limited, the algorithm 
and techniques chosen are considered representative of their respective approaches 
(being the most cited and considered the best), and it would at least set a new 
benchmark and reference for other implementations to follow. 
PCA is one of the most used algorithms and has proven to be very effective for 
information compression in face recognition system. Furthermore, researchers have 
shown that PCA performs well in recognition when the training data set is small (which 
is the case in this thesis), and is very stable with different training sets (Jafri and 
Arabnia, 2009). 
For the watermarking techniques, LSB, DCT and DWT are representative of their 
specific approaches. LSB is based on the Spatial Domain while DCT and DWT are both 
based on the Frequency/Transform Domain. In the frequency domain, coefficients are 
only slightly adjusted, which makes it more robust against geometric attacks such as 
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noise, scaling and others (Manoharan et al., 2010) as well as unnoticeable in terms of 
changes to the original image. 
1.7  MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The focus of the thesis is on complementing face recognition biometric systems with 
watermarking systems to increase the level of security. In doing so, it must be ensured 
that the combination of the two systems does not degrade the performance of either one, 
and that the level of security is indeed improved at all 8 vulnerable positions especially 
in maintaining the authenticity of the transmitted data against replay attack. 
1.8  CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This research focusses on proposing a suitable combination of a face recognition 
algorithm and a watermarking technique as watermarked face recognition scheme that 
will ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted in the face recognition system, 
which will then increase its level of security. 
Chapter One introduces the problem domain leading to the advantages of 
complementing face recognition algorithm with watermarking technique to increase the 
level of security. The problem statement is derived from the presented arguments which 
then translates into the research objectives and defines the main contributions of the 
thesis. An outline of the methodology is provided as well as the scope. 
Chapter Two outlines the literature on previous research in the problem area, with a 
brief review of face recognition systems and the security problems that may still arise. 
Watermarking systems are then explored as a means to increase the level of security, 
which will not only be in terms of the algorithms proposed, but also the watermarking 
techniques deployed in order to ensure the authenticity of the data transmitted within the 
face recognition systems. This will then highlight the main contributions of the thesis. 
Chapter Three presents the core of the research, which gives the details of the 
proposed watermarked face recognition scheme in section 1.5 Methodology. The 
chapter proposes the PCA—DCT system as a suitable and viable combination of a face 
recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique, with minimal degradation in the 
performance of the individual systems. The chapter also details a watermarking 
technique using DCT that will ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted in 
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the PCA face recognition system, in particular at the 8 vulnerable positions where data 
may be intercepted and/or resubmitted, thus increasing the level of security of the PCA 
face recognition system. 
Chapter Four begins with a description of the experiment set up, followed by an 
explanation on the implementation of the experiments. The results for each experiment 
will be presented, analyzed and discussed. The five experiments for the validation of the 
proposal are: (1) Determining the frequency band for watermarking; (2) Non 
degradation of PCA and DCT due to the combination; (3) Replay attack prevention – 
system rejection of captured data; (4) Robustness of the watermark scheme; (5) 
Comparative study of watermarking techniques. 
The main contributions and conclusions from this research will be summarized in 
Chapter Five. Possible future work will also be discussed either based on the constraints 
arising from this research or on improvements and extensions of the proposed approach. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In preparation to achieve the three objectives given in section 1.3, this chapter begins 
with an exploration of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face recognition 
systems, and in particular with reference to the 8 threats that have been listed out by 
Ratha et al., (2001). In addition, the most popular holistic approach for face recognition, 
namely the PCA, is singled out due its advantages over the others. 
Biometric watermarking techniques proposed by previous researchers within the face 
recognition environment are studied and classified according to their proposed solutions 
to the said threats. The Least Significant Bits (LSB), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), 
and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) techniques, being representative of their 
respective approaches, are looked at to complement the PCA to enhance its level of 
security. Particular emphasis is given to the DCT, as it is reported (Weilong, Meng and 
Shiqian, 2005) that it would probably perform the best. 
The literature survey would then give a very good idea towards proposing a suitable 
combination of a face recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique as 
watermarked face recognition scheme to enhance the security of face recognition 
systems, especially in terms of the authenticity of the data being transmitted. These will 
be presented in Chapter Three, together with all the other components to meet the three 
main objectives listed earlier in Chapter One. 
2.2 BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS MODEL 
Biometric authentication systems have several advantages over traditional 
authentication mechanisms that are based on passwords or tokens (e.g. smart cards). 
Biometric technologies rely on the statistical analysis measurement from an individual’s 
biometric traits to determine his or her identity. Since biometric authentication systems 
use individual biometric traits (fingerprints, iris, face, palm print, hand geometry, voice 
and others) that are essentially permanent to an individual as a means of authentication, 
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the systems provide a more reliable and much stronger factor of authentication 
compared to tokens and passwords. 
A password (knowledge) is something a user (or a group of users) knows and 
supposedly no one else. The main drawback of passwords is the necessity to memorize 
the suitable combination of characters made up from uppercase and lowercase letters, 
numbers and symbols of at least eight characters long (SANS Institute, 2014). The 
password must be different for every system the user is registered for. Even though the 
number of possible passwords can be generated from eight characters, people tend to 
use easily guessed ones that are easier to memorize, such as the date of birth (‘041180’) 
or ‘qwerty’. A poorly constructed password can be easily hacked by deploying brute 
force or dictionary attacks. Single sign-on services are now being offered to reduce the 
memorization load, but this is at the expense of trusting a single entity to provide strong 
security and respect your privacy. 
A token (key) is something a user (or a group of users) has and again supposedly no 
one else. The basic principle of this factor/type is equivalent to requiring a key to 
unlock the door. It may refer to a physical device for authorized users of the service to 
facilitate authentication. The limitation of a token is that it may be lost or captured, with 
which attackers would easily be able to access the system without any knowledge of the 
authorized user or the system itself. On the other hand, should the token be lost or 
captured, the user would be physically aware of the missing token, thus the necessary 
procedures can be carried out to block the token from the authorized access list. 
Biometric authentication systems do not have the disadvantages of the password or 
token system, as the authorization ‘keys’ are essentially derived from the biometric 
traits of the authorized user. In general, a generic biometric authentication system 
consists of five main modules: sensor, feature extraction, matcher, face database, and 
application device, as shown in Figure 2.1 and are discussed below. 
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Figure 2.1: Generic biometric authentication system 
The scanner module is for capturing of the raw biometric data of the individual 
seeking to be authorized, which is in the form of an image, video or audio using a 
scanning or sensing device. Scanning/sensor devices vary for each biometric trait to be 
captured. There are also multimodal biometric systems, where two or more biometric 
traits are captured. For instance, a camera is used to capture the face image and 
subsequently a fingerprint device is used to scan the fingerprint of the person. The 
biometric samples will then be pre-processed in a controlled environment to remove 
noise, for image adjustments, and for sharpening due to variations from illumination 
effects. The treated biometric samples are handed over to the feature extraction module 
for further processing. 
The feature extraction module extracts the salient features of the pre-processed 
images to obtain the relevant information using feature extraction methods designed for 
the selected biometric traits and specific applications. The resulting features are then 
sent to the matching module for further processing. 
The matching module matches the extracted features of the person seeking 
authorization against a database of features of authorized users, referred to as biometric 
templates. The authorized users are pre-enrolled, where at the time of enrolment the 
same process as the above would be carried out and the extracted features are stored in 
the database alongside the user’s identity to form the biometric template. At runtime, 
the matching module calculates a matching/similarity score to determine or verify the 
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identity of the user. A score above a certain threshold will result in an acceptance, else a 
rejection. This result is then sent to the last module, which is the application device (e.g. 
a door, a safe deposit box). 
In the past 15 years, research on biometric systems has seen a very significant 
increase because of its high demand, and this is assisted with the availability of higher 
processing power due to advances in computer and communication technology. 
Researchers have developed advanced algorithms for recognition, such as for face, iris, 
fingerprint, voice, amongst others (Morizet et al., 2007). The focus in this thesis is on 
face recognition, although much of the results should also be applicable in other 
biometric systems. 
2.3 FACE RECOGNITION 
Face recognition systems are used for identifying individuals, and they have very 
much grown in demand due to the wide range of commercial use and for law 
enforcement, supported with the availability of more feasible technologies after 30 
years of research (Zhao et al., 2003). Some applications include those listed in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1: Typical applications of face recognition 
Areas Specific Applications 
Entertainment Video games, virtual reality, training programs 
Human-robot-interaction, human-computer-
interaction 
Smart cards Driver’s license, entitlement programs 
Immigration, national ID, passports, voter 
registration 
Welfare fraud 
Information security TV parental control, personal device log on, desktop 
log on 
Application security, database security, file 
encryption 
Intranet security, internet access, medical records 
Secure trading terminals 
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Law enforcement and 
surveillance 
Advanced video surveillance, CCTV control 
Portal control, post event analysis 
Shoplifting, suspect tracking and investigation 
  
2.3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of face recognition 
Face recognition offers several advantages over other biometric methods, such as: 
a) User involvement - face recognition can be done passively without the needs of 
users to stand in front of the camera, since recognition can be made from a distance 
with a long zoom range and an image stabilizer camera. However, the user needs to 
scan his thumb on a fingerprint device for fingerprint recognition, place his palm on 
a hand rest for hand geometry detection, or stand in a fixed position for iris or retina 
identification. The evasion of non-cooperation involvement from the user is 
beneficial for security and surveillance purposes. 
b) Data acquisition - extracted biometric data from hands and fingers can be 
considered useless if the skin tissue is damaged (e.g. bruised, cracked), iris and retina 
identification needs expensive equipment and is much too sensitive to body motion, 
signatures can be forged or modified, voice recognition can be disturbed by 
surrounding noises and others. On the other hand, facial images can be easily 
obtained through a simple setup and using inexpensive fixed cameras. Furthermore, 
there are also good face recognition algorithms with appropriate pre-processing 
techniques to tackle problems due to noise and slight variations in orientation, scale 
and illumination. 
c) Physical interaction – there are technologies that require multiple individuals to 
interact with each other (e.g. touching) or using the same device for capturing their 
biometric data, which would expose the individuals to transmissions of germs or 
viruses. Face recognition does not require any such interaction. 
On the other hand, there are also drawbacks to face recognition. For example, the 
image acquired in an outdoor environment still remains one of the major difficulties due 
to changes of light illumination or the pose of the person (Zhao et al., 2003). It is quite 
clear that the current perceptibility of face recognition systems is still far inferior to 
human perceptibility for recognizing face images. Facial expressions also pose major 
problems, where even a big smile can make the recognition system become less 
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effective. As a result, Canada, for example, only allows for images with a neutral 
expression in passports (Passport Canada, 2012).  
2.3.2 Face recognition approaches 
According to Zhao et al., (2003), a generic face recognition process begins with the 
insertion of input images, through face detection, feature extraction, face recognition. 
and finally to verification, as shown  in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Architecture of a face recognition system 
The face image is first captured using a scanning device such as a camera. The 
captured face image is then put through the face detection process where it involves the 
separation of the face image into two regions, the salient region, which is the face area, 
and the background region. The goal of face detection process is to determine the 
existence of any face(s) in the image, and if found, to return the face area within the 
bounding box (Hatem, 2015). The face area is then pre-processed, where unwanted 
noise is removed and it is also normalized. After that, the feature extraction process 
extracts the important features of the face image, where the distinctive facial features 
are identified and extracted, possibly with the help of data compression techniques 
(which will be discussed more later on). Finally, the face recognition process gives the 
results of the recognition based on the matching status.   
There are methods and techniques for each of the modules given in Figure 2.2, but 
for the moment the methods tend to depend on the underlying applications. For 
instance, image database investigations may require static sharp and clean images taken 
by a standard camera and the recognition would require a certain set of techniques, 
while video images would obviously require a different device and certainly a different 
set of techniques. As this research deals with static biometric data and not videos, the 
focus will be on face recognition methods for intensity images. The methods for this 
situation fall into two main categories: feature-based and holistic approaches (Brunelli 
and Poggio, 1993; Grudin, 2000; Heisele et al., 2003; Gottumukkal and Asari, 2004; 
Image 
Face 
detection 
Pre-
processing 
Feature 
extraction 
Face 
recognition 
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Jian et al., 2004; Ahonen et al., 2006; Neerja and Walia, 2008; Kumar et al., 2011; 
Fernandes and Bala, 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Jangid et al., 2015). 
i) Feature-based approaches 
Early work carried out on automated face recognition was mostly using 
featured based approaches. In essence, the first process is to identify and extract 
distinctive facial features from the image of the subject, such as the eyes, mouth, 
nose and others, and then the geometric relationship among those facial points 
are computed and converted into a vector of geometric features. Using these 
measurements, standard statistical pattern recognition techniques are then 
employed to match faces. Kanade (1973) was one of the earliest recorded 
attempts using such techniques. The author adapted simple image processing 
methods to capture a vector of 16 facial parameters made up of ratios of 
distances, areas and angles. He then used a simple Euclidean distance 
measurement for the matching module. Another well-known feature based 
approach was proposed by Wiskott et al., (1997) using an elastic bunch graph 
matching method, adopting Dynamic Link Structures (Lades et al., 1993) as part 
of the technique. Although this method was among the best performing ones in 
the FERET evaluation (Philips et al., 1996; Philips et al., 1997), it had quite 
serious drawbacks so much so that for the first 70 faces the graph placement had 
to be positioned manually before the elastic graph matching would become 
adequately dependable (Sukthankar, 2000). Other methods are based on the 
grayscales difference of unimportant components and important components, by 
using feature blocks, set of Haar-like feature block in the Adaboost method 
(Jones and Viola, 2003) to change the grayscales distribution into the feature. In 
the Local Binary Patterns (LBP) method (Shu et al., 2006), every face image is 
divided into blocks, where each block has its corresponding central pixel. Then 
the neighbouring pixels are examined. Based on the grayscales value of the 
central, a given pixel changes its neighbour’s value to 0 or 1. Then a histogram 
is built for every region and the histograms are subsequently combined into a 
feature vector for the face image. Another technique is using the Gabor wavelets 
transform as feature extraction (Lim et al., 2009). The advantages of these 
methods are their concentration on important components of the face, such as 
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eyes, nose and mouth, but the drawback is that they do not represent the global 
structure of the face and its texture. 
ii) Holistic approaches 
Holistic approaches use global information on face images rather than local 
features. These approaches can be subdivided into two groups: statistical and 
Artificial Intelligent (AI) approaches.  
In statistical approaches, the image is represented as a 2D array of intensity 
values and the recognition is measured by comparing the input face and all the 
other faces in the database using direct correlation computation. Although this 
approach is simple to carry out, it only works under limited and controlled 
environments, such as equal illumination, scale, pose and others. The Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) method and Linear Discriminant Analysis method 
are examples of statistical holistic approaches of face recognition. 
Neural network and machine learning techniques are the use of some tools 
from AI to recognize faces. These would include the use of fuzzy logic backed 
by knowledge bases, or the use of neural networks, genetic algorithms, Hidden 
Markov models and others. 
Our research is focused on protecting the face image against replay attacks within a 
holistic approach specifically for the PCA algorithm, which will be discussed further in 
the next section. 
2.3.3 Face recognition algorithms 
Within the face recognition techniques, there are also various algorithms proposed 
for the various modules described earlier, namely for the pre-processing, feature 
extraction, and matching modules. Within these, according to Lu et al., (2003), two 
issues are central to all such algorithms, which are feature extraction for face 
representation, and classification of new face images based on the chosen feature 
representation.  
Due to the abundance of research on face recognition algorithms (Jafri and Arabnia, 
2009), this research will look at mainly the feature extraction component, and in 
particular, where the main objective is the representation for matching – and to look at 
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techniques that can introduce low-dimensional feature representation with enhanced 
discriminatory power for face objects. This is essentially because the main objective of 
the research is enhance security within face recognitions systems by embedding 
watermarks, and such embedding will have a major impact in the representation. 
Within feature extraction, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) are considered as two classic tools in appearance-based 
approaches for data reduction and feature extraction. According to Lu et al., (2003),  
LDA outperforms PCA as LDA focusses more on the most discriminant feature 
extraction. However, LDA may suffer “small sample size problem” (SSS) that occur in 
high dimensional pattern recognition. 
2.3.4 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
PCA is one the most successful techniques that have been used in image recognition 
and compression. PCA was first introduced in 1901 by Karl Pearson, and rapidly 
became a regularly used tool for data analysis exploration. It is a statistical method that 
uses factor analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the data space to a significantly 
smaller dimensionality of feature space. PCA is the basis of many techniques in data 
mining and information retrieval (Halko et al., 2010). 
The PCA in face recognition consists of methods for calculating the mean, deviation, 
covariance, eigenvalue, eigenvector, eigenfaces and projection of the face space. There 
are three essential steps in PCA face recognition: 
a) Preparation of the database of authorized persons (Training phase) 
b) Preparation of a fresh image to be authenticated (Testing phase) 
c) Matching of (b) with an element of (a) 
For (a), the following three figures illustrate the process, Figure 2.3 giving the 
overall picture. For each captured 2D image of an authorised person, the picture will be 
converted to a grayscale image, which is essentially a 2D matrix of pixels. The 2D 
matrix (N=rows, N=columns) will then be transformed into 1D vector matrix by reading 
column-by-column. Then all the resulting 1D matrices will be combined to become a 
large set of data (database). 
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Figure 2.3: Schematic diagram of the image recognition process 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The process of an image matrix conversion 
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Figure 2.5: The combination of all single vectors to vector matrix T 
Suppose the total number of images = M, with each image i being represented by a 
vector Гi. The mean for each row is calculated and tabulated in a 1D vector Ψ: 
𝛹 =
1
𝑛
∑Г𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(1) 
To get a set of vectors 𝛷𝑖, subtract the mean face vector Г𝑖 minus 𝛹: 
𝛷𝑖 = Г𝑖  − 𝛹 
(2) 
The purpose of subtracting the mean image from each image vector is to be left with 
only the distinguishing features from each face and “removing” in a way information 
that is common to both. All the values of Φi will be assigned to a new matrix A: 
𝐴 = [𝛷1𝛷2𝛷3, … . . , 𝛷𝑛] 
(3) 
Then the covariance of the matrix A is computed using 
C = AA
T
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Note that the Covariance matrix has simply been made by putting one modified image 
vector obtained in one column each. Also note that C is a N
2
 x N
2
 matrix and A is a N
2
 
x M matrix. 
We now need to calculate the Eigenvectors µi of C. However, note that C is a N
2
 x N
2
 
matrix, and it would return N
2
 Eigenvectors, each being N
2
 dimensional. As this number 
is HUGE, the computations required would easily make the system run out of memory.  
As such, instead of AA
T
, consider the matrix A
T
A. Recall that A is a N
2
 x M matrix, 
thus A
T
A is a M x M matrix. If we find the Eigenvectors of this matrix, it would return 
M Eigenvectors, each of Dimension M x 1, which we call Eigenvectors vi..  
Now, from some properties of matrices, it follows that: µi = Avi. We had found vi earlier. 
This implies that using vi we can calculate the M largest Eigenvectors AAT. Then recall 
that M <<N
2
, as M is simply the number of training images. 
Find the best M Eigenvectors of C = AA
T
 by using the relation discussed above, 
namely: µi = Avi. Also keep in mind that ||µi|| = 1. 
Select the K Eigenvectors, where the selection is done heuristically. Now each face in 
the training set (minus the mean), 𝛷𝑖can be represented as a linear combination of these 
Eigenvectors µi: 
𝛷𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑢𝑗, where 𝑢𝑗 are Eigenfaces. 
These weights can be calculated as: 
𝑤𝑗 = 𝑢𝑗
𝑇𝛷𝑖 
 (5) 
Each normalized training image is represented in this basis as a vector. 
Ωi =[𝜔1, 𝜔2, … . , 𝜔𝑘′] 
(6) 
where i = 1,2….M. This means that we have to calculate such a vector corresponding to 
every image in the training set and store them as templates. 
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We have thus found the Eigenfaces for the training images, their associated weights 
after selecting a set of the most relevant Eigenfaces, and have stored those vectors 
corresponding to each training image. 
If an unknown probe face Г is to be recognized, then: 
1. We normalize the incoming probe Г as 𝛷 = Г − 𝛹. 
2. We then project this normalized probe onto the Eigenspace (the collection of 
Eigenvectors/faces) and find out the weights. 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖
𝑇𝛷 
3. The normalized probe 𝛷 can then simply be represented as: 
Ω =[𝜔1, 𝜔2, … . , 𝜔𝑘] 
After the feature vector (weight vector) for the probe has been found, we simply need to 
classify it. For the classification task we could simply use some distance measures. In 
the case where we use distance measures, the classification is done as follows: 
Find 𝑐𝑟 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛‖Ω − Ω𝑖‖. This means that we take the weight vector of the probe we 
had just computed and find its distance with the weight vectors associated with each of 
the training image. 
If 𝑐𝑟 < 𝜃, where 𝜃 is a threshold chosen heuristically, then we can say that the probe 
image is recognized as the image with which it gives the lowest score. 
If however 𝑐𝑟 > 𝜃, then the probe does not belong to the database. 
The Euclidean Distance is probably the most widely used distance metric (Sharma and 
Vashisht, 2012).  
‖x −  y‖𝑒 = √|𝑥𝑖 − y𝑖|
2
 
(7) 
 
35 
 
2.4 BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM THREATS 
In today’s highly technical world, the mechanisms for determining the identity of an 
individual are vitally important in commercial as well as non-commercial applications. 
The implementation of biometric authentication systems could solve such problems 
with the use of user individual physiological (e.g., fingerprint, face, iris) or behavioral 
(e.g., body language, handwriting) as identification. However, there are still major 
challenges in biometric systems, which can be divided into two categories: external and 
internal factors. 
External factors have the disadvantage of the lack of secrecy, such as face images 
which can be found literally anywhere on the internet, and fingerprints can be traced out 
on left objects. The privacy of biometric data can also be a concern in cross application 
usage, where the biometric data used in one system (e.g. company) may be used in 
another system (e.g. bank). As for internal factors, the vulnerabilities could come from 
the biometric system itself, where data may be intercepted, manipulated and then 
resubmitted back into the system to obtain approval. One main problem with external 
factors is that biometric authentication systems cannot guarantee that the biometric data 
in the authentication phase is coming from the same legitimate user as the one at the 
time of enrolment. The main issue for internal factors is somewhat similar as the 
systems cannot guarantee that the current data in the system (e.g. transmission between 
modules in a database) is from genuine users. This thesis focusses on internal factors, 
where the solution would be in protecting the biometric data throughout the system. 
As explained earlier, biometric authentication systems offer many advantages in 
enhancing user convenience and robust security over traditional authentication schemes 
(tokens and passwords). However, they are still susceptible to various types of threats. 
Ratha et al. (2001) analysed these threats and listed them out into 8 vulnerable positions 
(refer to Figure 1.1). 
a) Attacks at the scanner (position a) 
At this position, intruders may trick the system by presenting to the sensor a fake or 
dummy biometric trait, such as an artificial finger made from silicon to bypass 
fingerprint recognition systems, a face mask to deceive face recognition systems, or a 
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fake iris contact lens to cheat iris recognition systems. These types of attacks fall under 
the category spoofing attack. 
Previous researchers have noted the success of identification using fake biometrics. 
Much work has been done on spoofing attacks using fingerprint traits (Putte and 
Keuning, 2000; Henniger et al., 2010), and surprisingly such attacks do not require any 
knowledge of the system, such as on the applied feature extraction algorithm, the 
matching algorithm, and even the user identity is not necessary. This type of attack is 
also often referred to as ‘zero effort attack’, and for that reason its frequency is rather 
high compared to others. 
Putte and Keuning (2000) have done a thorough comparative study between the 
fake/dummy and real live fingers presented at the sensor for commercial fingerprint 
recognition systems. Experiments were carried out for two different approaches of 
capturing the fingerprint, of the real owner, with and without owner assistance. The 
authors used a plaster cast on the owner’s finger and then the cast is filled with silicone 
rubber to create a wafer thin silicon dummy. The dummy fingerprint can be easily glued 
to an attacker’s finger without being noticed by human eyes. In the second approach, 
the fingerprint was captured using a glass or a surface. As expected, the quality of the 
fingerprint dummy is much better without owner assistance. The experiment results 
showed that both dummy fingerprints can be accepted as a real finger. 
Henniger et al., (2010) assessed potential attacks on fingerprint recognition. The 
authors used an attack tree for keeping track of the multitude of potential vulnerabilities. 
They noted that only a few fingerprint recognition products have achieved a security 
certificate level and even then only on a low Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2 
(Canadian Communications Security Establishment, 2001; Australian Defense Signals 
Directorate, 2003; TÜViT, 2005; German Federal Office for Information Security, 
2008; German Federal Office for Information Security, 2008), despite the fact that 
numerous guidelines on security evaluations have been developed, published and 
distributed (Common Criteria Biometric Evaluation Methodology Working Group, 
2002; International Standard ISO/IEC 19792) and protection profiles (UK CESG, 2001; 
U.S. Information Assurance Directorate, 2007; U.S. Information Assurance Directorate, 
2007; German Federal Office for Information Security, 2008; German Federal Office 
for Information Security, 2010; German Federal Office for Information Security, 2010). 
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As such, the authors conclude that efforts on evaluation towards security issues in 
biometric systems are still relevant for investigation. The evaluation is based on the 
following factors (International Standard ISO/IEC 18045): 
(i) Duration for an attacker to identify vulnerability, develop an attack method, and 
execute the attack; 
(ii) Technical expertise required; 
(iii) Knowledge of the target systems required; 
(iv) Tools required for identifying and exploiting the vulnerability; 
(v) Window of opportunity for the attack. 
The authors evaluated a number of potential attacks using different methods. Table 
2.2 presents the attacks carried out together with the corresponding evaluation rating 
based on the aspects given in Table 2.3 (International Standard ISO/IEC 18045). 
Table 2.2: The attacks assessment rating on fingerprint recognition (source: 
Henniger, 2010) 
Attacks Time 
taken 
Expertise Knowledge 
of target 
system 
Window of 
opportunity 
Tools Required attack 
potential 
Sum Rating 
Construct a dummy 
from a given 
fingerprint image 
1 3 0 0 4 8 Basic 
By pass liveliness 
detection 
4 6 7 1 4 22 High 
Capture a latent 
fingerprint from the 
touched surfaces 
0 3 0 10 1 14 Moderate 
Zero effort - use a 
real finger until 
reaches false 
acceptance 
13-19 0 0 1 0 14-
20 
Moderate - 
High 
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Table 2.3: The evaluation factors on attacks with difficulty levels and rating positions 
(source: Henniger, 2010) 
Factors Level Value 
Time taken ≤ 1 day 0 
 ≤ 1 week 1 
 ≤ 1 month 4 
 ≤ 3 months 10 
 ≤ 6 months 17 
 ˃ 6 months 19 
 Not practical ∞ 
Expertise Layman 0 
 Proficient 3 
 Expert 6 
 Multiple experts 8 
Knowledge of target 
system 
Public 0 
 Restricted 3 
 Sensitive 7 
 Critical 11 
Window of opportunity Unnecessary/unlimited 0 
 Easy 1 
 Moderate 4 
 Difficult 10 
 None ∞ 
Tools Standard 0 
 Specialized 4 
 Bespoke 7 
 Multiple bespoke 9 
   
The investigation shows that each attack contributes different potentialities.  For 
instance, the attack potentiality for constructing fingerprint dummies from fingerprint 
images is rated as basic. This is because it is not difficult to implement the attack, as it 
only takes less than a week to construct fingerprint dummies and only rather simple 
proficient expertise is required for constructing the dummies. Other attacks, such as 
avoiding liveliness detection, is rated high, as it is more challenging to carry out this 
39 
 
attack since knowledge of the target system is required. Such information is very 
sensitive, and it would probably need to involve help from insiders (persons involved in 
the development of the fingerprint sensors). It would also require a rather high level of 
expertise. 
In face recognition systems, at position a, a printed face image (captured from social 
media applications and others) of an authorised person may be placed in front of the 
scanner (camera) to deceive the system and obtain a successful authorization. The 
captured face image captured from the scanner (possibly before a watermark is 
embedded) may also be used in an attack. 
b) Attacks at the channel between the scanner and the feature extractor (position b) 
An attack at position b may take place after the scanner captures the biometric trait 
and sends it to the feature extraction module for further processing. At this location, the 
transmission channel is vulnerable to several threats, such as eavesdropping attacks, 
replay attacks, man in the middle attacks, and brute force attacks. Countermeasures to 
these attacks include transmitting data over an encrypted channel, use of symmetric or 
asymmetric keys, digital signatures and utilization of Timestamp/Time to Live (TTL) 
tags. However, these countermeasures only protect the transmission channel but not the 
transmitted biometric data, e.g. an encrypted channel only protects the biometric data 
while in transmission, but once decrypted, the biometric data is no longer secure. 
Watermarking is one of the solutions to overcome this problem, as a hidden data may be 
attached to the biometric data without being destroyed.   
c) Attacks on the feature extractor module (position c) 
At this location, the resubmission of false data or component replacement may be 
forced by an attacker to produce pre-selected features for a successful authorization 
using a Trojan horse injected in the feature extractor module. A Trojan horse is 
basically a program that hides in a standard program in a system and will infect other 
files the system. A Trojan horse enables an attacker to control the system remotely and 
captures private information from the system through an online connection and may 
send imposter feature values to the matcher module. The counter measures for such 
attacks include creating strong and tested feature extraction algorithms with signed 
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components. The matcher module should be able to recognize that the extracted features 
are from the specific feature extractor module and not from elsewhere. 
Position c attacks involve face feature values extracted from the face image. The 
captured face features from this location and from two other locations (positions d and 
e) cannot be resubmitted at positions a and b as the original face image, as they are in a 
non-reversible compression form, meaning that the extracted features cannot be 
reconstructed back to its original biometric image (James L Wayman et. al. 2005). 
d) Attacks at the channel between the feature extractor and matcher (position d) 
At position d, the feature values of an authorized user may be replaced by attacker 
selected values. This type of attack is similar to a position b attack (biometric traits 
captured for resubmission later on), except that here the attacker captures the feature 
values of an authorized user on the transmission channel between the feature extractor 
and matcher. 
Adler (2003) reports on a specific user account being attacked using a face image 
synthesis technique. An initial face image is selected randomly, and then modified using 
the matching scores coming from the matcher that is generated for each previously 
successful face image. A weighted sum of Eigen-faces at each step that is generated 
from public domain face databases is added to the current candidate face image. The 
modified face image that leads to the highest matching score is given as input as a new 
candidate image. After a number of iterations for a modified face image, a sufficiently 
large matching score may be obtained. 
In general, features values may be captured at three positions: positions – c, d and e. 
and resubmitted back at positions c and d. A mechanism is needed to ensure that the 
features values have not been tampered and at the same time will not disturb the 
originality of the features values. 
e) Attacks on the matcher (position e) 
Attacks at position e are similar to the type 3 attacks (position c), except that at this 
location the Trojan horse program is injected into the matcher module. The Trojan horse 
program enables the attacker to control the matcher module to produce high matching 
scores and eventually grants authorization to access the system. In addition, the attacker 
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may even be able to command the system to produce low matching scores or block 
authorized users from accessing the system and finally causing denial of service. 
f) Attacks at the channel between the system database and matcher (position f) 
This type of attack is similar to type 2 attacks (position b) except that the biometric 
images are intercepted between the system database module and matcher module. The 
attacker can capture, replace or alter the biometric images and resubmitted later. The 
resubmission of captured biometric image cannot be done at position g, since there is 
not much position, as it carries the authenticating data and not the data to be 
authenticated. However, the biometric image captured from this position may be 
resubmitted at positions a and position b. 
g) Attacks on the system database (position g) 
In biometric authentication systems, the authorized user biometric images are stored 
in the database system module. The main threat at this module is the attacker 
compromising the database security, such as reading or replacing biometric image(s). 
This can be due to unintended activity or misuse by authorized users, with design flaws 
and programming bugs in the database giving rise to various security vulnerabilities. 
Once the database has been exploited, the attacker can make adjustments to the stored 
biometric images, such as to add new unauthorized biometric images as genuine users, 
or to modify or remove existing images from the system.  
As mentioned in (Skoric, 2010), unauthorized access to this module is among the 
most dangerous threats to users’ privacy and security, and thus many researchers have 
focused on protecting the database, in particular with  the use of watermarking 
techniques. In 2001, Hill demonstrated a method where a fingerprint image could be 
recreated based on the fingerprint template retrieved from database. The method is 
adapted from Sherlock and Monro (1993), which uses the location of singular points to 
estimate the orientation field of the fingerprint. Then the ridge patterns that pass through 
the minutiae points are generated using a line drawing algorithm. However, Ross et al., 
(2005) pointed out that several vendors of minutiae-based fingerprint systems disagreed 
that the template information could be regenerated to produce fingerprint images. The 
authors also showed that the minutiae templates are vulnerable to masquerade attacks 
and the orientations of fingerprint ridges can be predicted using the minutiae points. 
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They proposed an approach to exclude certain minutiae from the template that are 
critical for reconstructing fingerprint images without affecting the recognition 
performance. Furthermore, according to James L Wayman et. al. (2005), the extracted 
features are in a form of non-reversible compression, which means that the extracted 
features cannot be reconstructed back to its original biometric image. 
Position g is indeed the core and one of the most vulnerable modules in biometric 
authentication systems. As with position f, the biometric images captured from this 
position could be resubmitted at positions a and b. A mechanism such as certificates, 
signatures and others is needed to ensure that the biometric images belong to this 
specific biometric system. If an attacker tries to submit his/her own biometric image, the 
system would then know that the biometric image is not part of the certified biometric 
images at position g. Furthermore, if the certified biometric images from position g is 
resubmitted at position a, they will be immediately rejected as the mechanism already 
exists and can be readily detected. 
h) Attacks at the channel between the matcher and the application device (position h) 
In position h, the attacker may intercept the results of the matcher at the transmission 
channel between the matcher and the application device (e.g. a door), either to accept or 
reject the user from accessing the system. The approval code may also be captured and 
resubmitted at this position at a later stage. For the moment, this type of attack is very 
difficult to protect against, but it is also extremely difficult to mount. 
2.5 DIGITAL IMAGE WATERMARKING 
A watermark is defined as the imperceptible information embedded into a medium 
while integrity of that medium remains intact, while watermarking is the process of 
achieving this objective (Petitcolas et al., 1999). A typical example is the watermark 
used in banknotes. The concept of watermarking may also be referred to as a passive 
way of protecting data because it does not control access to the data – it only marks data 
by not destroying it. 
Watermarking is also considered as data concealment or data hiding, a concept 
known from steganography, although steganography is mainly concerned with data 
hiding, whereas watermarking has stringent rules with concerns on securing the 
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embedded data and protecting it against removal and tampering. It provides a secure 
way of data transmission. 
2.5.1 Generic watermarking system 
In general, a watermarking system consists of an embedder and a detector. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.6 below, during the embedding process the original cover object 
C (e.g. image) and a watermark OW (e.g. text, logo image, audio) are combined 
together with an optional secret key K to generate the watermarked medium W’. There 
are several ways the embedding processes can be classified. The image, video, and 
audio watermarking techniques modify the cover medium in the spatial domain or in the 
frequency domain, or a combination in both domains. The watermarking techniques are 
described further on in section 2.5.6. The watermarked medium is then typically 
transmitted, recorded or shared for further processing. 
 
Figure 2.6: Watermark embedding 
 
In the detector process (see Figure 2.7), the watermarked medium is presented as an 
input to the watermark detector. Most detectors try to identify whether a particular 
watermark is or is not present in the watermarked medium. If a watermark is detected, a 
similarity measurement between the original watermark and the extracted watermark is 
computed to validate the ownership of watermarked medium. 
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Figure 2.7: Watermark detection 
The watermark detection/extraction process can be divided into three categories: 
— Informed/non-blind: the original medium as well as the watermark are 
needed for the retrieval process; it is also known as a private 
watermarking scheme, and it is for general purposes. 
— Semi-blind: the original medium is not required for detection, but the 
detector needs access to some other information; it is also known as a 
semi-private watermarking scheme, and its purpose is mainly to find 
whether that the watermark can be detected, such as for copyright 
protection (ownership), copy control (i.e. as in DVD where copying is 
not allowed), and fingerprinting where the goal is to identify the original 
recipient of the pirated copies. 
— Blind: does not require any reference to the original medium nor the 
watermark; it is also known as public watermarking scheme, and is the 
most challenging type of watermarking system, where it extracts in bits 
of the watermark data from the watermarked medium; it is mainly used 
for authentication purposes. 
2.5.2 Watermarking Properties 
There are three main properties of watermarking systems for digital images (Agreste 
et al., 2006): 
a) Robustness 
This property defines the watermark strength to adversary attacks. A watermark may 
be fragile, semi-fragile or robust based on the application needs. Fragile watermarks are 
designed to be distorted or ‘broken’ under the slightest changes to the cover image. 
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Semi-fragile watermarks are designed to break under all changes that exceed a user-
specified threshold (a threshold of zero would form a fragile watermark). Robust 
watermarks withstand moderate to severe signal processing attacks (compression, 
rescaling and others). 
There are a few methods of developing robust watermarking techniques, such as 
creating a dual watermarked image. In dual watermarking techniques, the cover image 
is protected using visible and invisible watermarks. The visible watermark is embedded 
into the cover image and the invisible watermark is added to it. Even if the visible 
watermark is removed, the invisible one would act as a backup. The other method is to 
add watermarks at different positions in the cover image, thus if one or two watermarks 
data are removed from the image then the other watermark would be there for 
validation. 
A common method to create a robust watermarked image is by strategically 
determining the location of embedding the watermark. For example, in the DCT 
domain, the image is divided into three different frequencies – High, Middle and Low. 
The high frequencies are prone to compression and noise attacks. The low frequencies 
are more visible to human eyes, but are more robust to image processing attacks. Most 
researchers select the middle frequencies to balance both of these factors, although other 
reasons may indicate otherwise. 
Another factor that may influence the robustness of a watermarked image is the size 
of the embedded watermark image. Smaller watermarks are easier to erase, whereas 
larger watermarks have more data values – if an attacker removes watermark data in one 
area, the watermark data in others area may still be left undisturbed. 
Watermarks in the robust category are resistant to malicious and non-malicious 
distortions, covering common image processing operations (noise insertion, contrast 
adjustment, smoothening, cropping), compression (JPEG), and geometrical transform 
(rotation, scaling, translation). 
 b) Data Payload 
Data payload is the number of watermark bits encoded within a unit of time or within 
a Work. For instance, for image, the data payload would refer to the number of bits 
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encoded within the image (Ingemar, 2008). This property evaluates how much hidden 
data can be embedded as a watermark so that it can remain detectable during an 
extraction process later on. The watermark can fall into two categories: the 1-bit or 
‘yes/no’ watermark, and the multi-bit watermark. In the former, a single sequence is 
embedded into an image as the watermark and the watermark detector correlates the 
received image with this known sequence and compares the results against a threshold 
to decide whether a watermark is present or not. For the multi-bit watermark, the 
embedded watermark detection can be achieved by comparing the watermark bits to the 
given pattern. If all watermark bits match, then the watermark is detected. 
c) Imperceptibility 
Watermarks may be visible or invisible depending on the desired applications. 
Visible watermarks are commonly used in ownership identification and for informing 
the public of the genuine owners of the cover images. However, such watermarks can 
be quite easily removed by attackers as the location of the watermark is visible, e.g. the 
BBC’s logo is always displayed at the corner of the broadcasted television programs, 
small prints of copyrighted images are clearly displayed in popular magazines. Invisible 
watermarks are mainly used for proof of ownership and for fingerprinting applications. 
Such watermarks are much more difficult to remove as their location in the cover 
medium is unknown and can only be estimated by an attacker. The watermark can be 
imperceptibly embedded into the cover medium by slightly modifying the host signal. 
An embedded watermark should not affect the quality of the cover image. It is 
usually preferred to have a watermarked image that is perceptually similar to the cover 
image. Watermarking should not introduce visible distortions as it degrades the 
aesthetic value of the watermarked image. Furthermore, the affected area might cause 
suspicion and a giveaway vulnerability for attackers. Some researchers use the terms 
fidelity or perceptual transparency for this property. Imperceptibility is the measurement 
of similarity between un-watermarked and watermarked images. The performance of 
imperceptibility for watermarking algorithms, in general, is calculated based on 
measures such as peak signal-to-noise ratio, mean square error, normalized cross 
correlation, and histogram similarity.  
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Again as with the more popular selection of the middle frequencies for robustness, 
for the popularly targeted low level of imperceptibly, other reasons may also indicate 
otherwise. Sometimes, the quality of the images to the naked eye may not be important 
if the images are always internal to the system and never presented to users, as long as 
the principal function of the system is effective. Watermarking in face recognition is a 
clear example of this, as the quality of the face image is not important as long as a high 
recognition rate is maintained and the security level is enhanced. 
2.5.3 Watermarking Applications 
The main applications of digital watermarking include the following. 
a) Copyright protection 
Copyright material distributed over the untrusted network may be protected using 
watermarking. The owner can protect the data audio, image or video from being 
illegally commercialized. Copyright protection here concerns the identification of the 
specific content ownership in protecting the rights of the owner. Robust watermark is 
most suitable in this application, as any attempt to remove the watermark would result 
in a severe degradation of the image perceptibility. The ownership of the image can also 
be identified from the embedded watermark. In biometric systems, watermarking may 
also be used to validate the owner of the biometric data, where a watermark may be 
attached with the relevant information for identification. 
 
b) Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting embeds unique information of the legal receiver in the image. Each 
distributed image is embedded with different watermarks allowing the owner to trace 
and monitor pirated images that are illegally obtained. Fingerprinting is quite similar to 
giving a barcode number to each product. Watermarking is an appropriate solution for 
this application as it can be invisible and is always attached to the image (Kougianos et 
al., 2009). If any illegal copy of an image is found, the source of the illegal copy can be 
traced back using the watermark extracted from the image. A robust watermark is 
required for this application, as the watermark has to survive many malicious and non-
malicious distortions. 
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c) Image and content authentication 
Image authentication is mainly associated with content integrity. The main objective 
of this application is to detect any modification on the original image. Fragile 
watermarking is suitable for this application, as any tampering and modification to the 
original image can be readily detected from the ‘broken’ watermark. Furthermore, the 
watermark is designed to be destroyed such that the tampered regions and how much it 
is altered can be determined (Zeng and Liu, 1999; Tian, 2003). 
2.5.4 Attacks on watermarks 
There is a variety of possible intentional and unintentional attacks on watermarking 
systems. The attacks can be classified into five different categories as listed below 
(Kundur and Hatzinakos, 2001; Cox et al., 2008): 
a) Signal processing operations – The attackers intentionally subject the watermarked 
image with various operations such as cropping, scaling, filtering, and compression to 
destroy the watermark data. 
b) Removal and interference attacks – The attackers attempt to remove or destroy the 
watermark data with additional noise, given that watermarks usually contain some noise 
in the host signal. Lossy compression, quantization, collusion, de-noising, re-
modulation, averaging, and noise storm are examples of this category of attacks. 
c) Geometric operations – The main intention of these attacks is to manipulate the 
watermarked image in a certain way such that the detector would not be able to find the 
watermark data. If the watermarked image survives affine transformations such as 
rotation, translation, and scaling, the watermarking scheme is resistant to geometric 
attacks. 
d) Cryptographic attacks - These attacks involve cracking the security installations in 
the watermarking scheme that are different from removal and geometric attacks. An 
example is searching for the secret key using brute force and embedding misleading 
watermarks. 
e) Protocol attacks - The attackers exploit the loopholes in the watermarking technique, 
such as to remove the watermark from the watermarked image and thereby claiming 
ownership. One known example of such an attacks is the IBM (Friedman, 1993) attack, 
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also known as the deadlock attack, inversion attack, or fake-original attack. This attack 
embeds extra fake watermarks to deceive the detector from being able to certify the 
original watermark. 
2.5.5 The embedded watermark media in biometric systems 
In a watermarking environment, the embedded watermark media plays an important 
role to protect the original image. Various types of watermark media have been 
considered in biometric systems for different purposes depending on the application – 
for example, the use of watermarks as secondary authentication, or as a mechanism in 
protecting the ownership of biometric images. We give below some of the embedded 
watermark media that have been used in biometric systems. Further details are given in 
Appendix A. 
a) Text 
Text is a common embedded watermark media in a watermarking environment. For 
example, (Sabu and Ann, 2011; Isa and Aljareh, 2012) have adapted text to be used as 
an additional authentication step to protect biometric images.    
b) Biometric image or feature value 
Many embed a biometric image or a feature value as a watermark especially in 
multimodal biometric authentication systems (Bedi et al., 2012; Behera and Govindan, 
2013; Kekre et al., 2015; Abdullah et al., 2015). The main purpose of such biometric 
watermarking schemes are to hide the owner’s additional biometric data and later to be 
extracted for verification during the authentication process. 
c) Demographic image 
A demographic image is made up of information related to the owner of the biometric 
image, such as name, id number, phone number, etc., to be used for ownership 
protection. For example, (Behera and Govindan, 2013) proposed embedding a 
demographic image together with fingerprint information as watermarks in their work 
as additional authentication. 
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As far as we have surveyed, none has so far implemented a timestamp as the embedded 
watermark media to protect the data transmitted against replay attacks. This will be one 
of our main contributions in this research.  
2.5.6 Watermarking techniques 
Watermarking is a process of embedding, into any form of information, digital signal 
that cannot be easily removed (Syed, 2011). Bamatraf et al., (2011) puts watermarking 
as a pattern of bits embedded into the digital image, audio and video signals to specify 
the file’s copyright information. Today, with the emergence of the internet and other 
electronic file transfer systems, user information can be easily altered without the 
author’s consent (Huang et al., 2010). It is thus important to protect the original medium 
against altering or tempering, whereupon watermarking may be attached to the original 
work for copyright control and others. 
Over the years, a number of watermarking techniques have been developed, and they 
can be categorized into two main types – Spatial Domain, and Frequency domain. 
2.5.6.1 Spatial Domain Techniques 
The watermark embedding process in the spatial domain involves the manipulation 
of the least significant bits of the multimedia content (Cox et al., 2002). The pseudo-
random number traversing method or a spread spectrum method can be used together 
with a key to disperse its spatial locations. The modified watermark can then be united 
with the content after applying a weighting factor that ensures robustness of the 
watermark as well as its imperceptibility. 
Although spatial domain watermarking is simpler to implement, and usually involves 
minimal computational complexity, its lack of robustness against many attacks (such as 
compression, blurring, cropping, and others) make it unfavourable as a watermarking 
scheme. Furthermore, spatial domain watermarking does not exploit the properties of 
the cover image, which can significantly help with the robustness of the watermark. 
Arguably the most effective, widely used, and certainly the simplest spatial domain 
technique is the Least Significant Bit (LSB). In computing terms, LSB is the bit position 
in a binary integer that is located at the rightmost end, which can determine whether the 
number is odd or even. In contrast, the Most Significant Bit (MSB) is the bit position 
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that is located at the leftmost end, which determines whether the number is negative or 
positive (Support, 2002). 
According to Sharma et al., (2012), LSB can survive image cropping, but when it 
comes to the addition of noise and lossy compression, the watermark may be easily 
defeated. Nonetheless, the attack is somehow not significant on the perceptibility of the 
cover image. There is an improvement on basic LSB substitution by using a pseudo-
random number generator to determine the pixels that would be useful for embedding, 
resulting in the watermark being secure from a third party (Sharma et al., 2012). LSB 
has proven to be a simple and quite powerful tool for steganography but still lacks 
robustness for watermarking (Shoemaker, 2002). 
In a paper by Bamatraf et al., (2011), another method of LSB watermarking is 
proposed, with an inversion of the watermark text and embedding it in a different order 
of the LSB. By doing this, no one would expect that the hidden watermark text is in a 
different order, and the operation comes with its inverses.  
2.5.6.2 Frequency domain techniques 
Watermarking in the frequency domain exploits the properties of the cover image, 
essentially based on the imperceptibility of the watermarked image and the robustness 
of the embedded watermarks. The human visual system is more sensitive to the 
degradation in smoother regions of an image and this is a prime target for lossy 
compression schemes. Therefore it is preferable to embed the watermark in noisy 
regions and the edges of the images. However, these would degrade the robustness of 
the watermark scheme. Two common watermarking techniques in the frequency domain 
are Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). 
2.5.6.2.1 Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 
DCT is a conversion technique on a signal into elementary frequency components 
(Rao et al., 1990). It converts an image to a sum of varying magnitudes and frequencies. 
Most DCT based watermarking techniques segment an image into non-overlapping 
blocks and apply DCT to each block. This will result in the converted blocks being 
grouped into three different frequency sub-bands – low frequency, middle frequency 
and high frequency, Shoemaker (2002). DCT-based watermarking is based on two facts. 
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The first is that most of the signal energy lies at the low frequency sub-band, which 
contains the most important visual parts of the image. The second is that usually signals 
in the high frequency sub-band can be readily removed through compression and noise 
attacks. As such, as both these properties affect each other, most watermarking schemes 
embed the watermark at the middle frequency sub-band, so that the image perceptibility 
will not be affected and the watermark cannot be easily removed through compression 
or noise attacks (Deng and Wang, 2003). 
Of main interest here is the Two-dimensional discrete cosine transform (2D-DCT) as 
defined in equation (8) for calculating the forward DCT, and with equation (9) as the 
means to calculate the reverse DCT coefficients (Gonzalez and Woods, 2002). DCT is 
closely related to the discrete Fourier transform. It is a separable linear transformation; 
that is, the two dimensional transform is equivalent to a one-dimensional DCT 
performed along a single dimension followed by a one-dimensional DCT in the other 
dimension. Both of these functions are provided in Matlab Image Processing Toolbox. 
The definition of the two-dimensional DCT for an input image A and output image B is 
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M and N are the row and column size of A, respectively. The DCT tends to 
concentrate information, making it useful for image compression applications. This 
transform can be inverted using equation (9) below: 
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In DCT, the absolute values of the coefficients corresponding to the low frequencies 
are higher and appear in the top-left corner of the image, while the high frequency 
coefficients appear in the bottom-right corner with lower absolute values (Guan-Ming 
Su, www). 
Robustness has become a key issue in watermarking techniques. More robust 
watermarking schemes are required to survive watermarking attacks. A watermarking 
scheme is considered robust if the cover image may be exploited but the hidden 
watermark remains intact and undisturbed. According to Barni et al. (1998), a 
watermark embedded by the DCT technique is robust to several signal processing 
techniques such as: 
— JPEG compression 
— low pass and median filtering 
— histogram equalization and stretching 
— dithering 
— addition of Gaussian noise 
— resizing 
— multiple watermarking 
54 
 
The above mentioned DCT frequency regions can be represented as in Figure 2.8 
below. FM represents the middle band frequency, and FL and FH are respectively the 
lowest and highest frequency bands. 
 
Figure 2.8: DCT frequency regions 
One of the methods for watermark detection is by comparing FM with the PN 
sequences (Pseudo-random sequences). A PN sequence is a sequence of binary 
numbers, e.g. ±1, which appears to be random but is actually in a perfectly deterministic 
order. If the correlation exceeds some threshold, then the watermark is present. 
According to Poljicak et al., (2011), the DCT approach is very robust to JPEG 
compression since JPEG itself makes use of DCT, but the DCT method lacks resistance 
to strong geometric distortions. 
2.5.6.2.2 Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) 
Another very well-known watermarking technique is DWT in the wavelet domain. 
According to Singh et al., (2010), DWT is the multiresolution description of an image. 
The decoding can be processed sequentially from low resolution to high resolution. In 
the low frequency, the signals are located in the frequency domain, while in the high 
frequency, the signals are located in the pixel domain. Wavelets have their energy 
concentrated in time and are well suited for the analysis of the transient, time varying 
signals. 
The 2D wavelet transform decomposes an image into the lower resolution 
approximate image (LL), horizontal (HL), vertical (LH), and diagonal (HH) detailed 
components. The perceptible watermark is embedded in the low frequency region, while 
the imperceptible watermark is embedded in the high frequency region. Figure 2.9 
below presents the transformation of the 2D wavelet transform. 
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Figure 2.9: 2 scale 2D Discrete Wavelet Transform 
The main advantage of the wavelet transform is that it is believed to have the most 
accurate model features of the Human Visual System (HVS) as compared to the FFT or 
DCT. The higher energy regions are the most appropriate for watermark embedding. 
The HVS is less sensitive to high-resolution details bands, namely LH, HL and HH. 
Furthermore, embedding watermarks in these regions help to increase the robustness of 
the watermark and has minimal impact on image quality (Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas, 
1999). However, the DWT technique lacks resistance to geometric transformations 
(Poljicak et al., 2011). 
2.5.7 Encryption – Arnold Transformation 
Within digital image watermarking, we have looked at: 
 Generic watermarking systems (2.5.1),  
 Watermarking properties (2.5.2),  
 Watermarking applications (2.5.3), 
 Attacks on watermarks (2.5.4),  
 The embedded watermark media in biometric systems (2.5.5), and most 
significantly, 
 Watermarking techniques (2.5.6). 
There is perhaps only one component left within this topic. For further security, 
sometimes it can be very useful to encrypt the watermark before embedding it in the 
cover image. Should an attacker steal the watermark, they would not be able to see the 
original watermark image, but only an encrypted version of it. 
LL2 HL2 
LH2 HH2 
HL1 
LH1 HH1 
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A common encryption technique used together with watermarking is the Arnold 
transformation (AT). AT is a simple and periodic algorithm, and the watermark is easily 
recoverable (unscrambled) from the encrypted version detected from the corresponding 
watermarked image [using the Arnold Transformation Algorithm (Wu et. al., (2009))]. 
The original image matrix is randomized into a new matrix for protection. Equation (10) 
is used to compute and map changes from an original point (x,y) to another point 
(𝑥𝑛−1, 𝑦𝑛−1) for a digital square image (NxN) array and the coordinate of the pixel is  
𝐹 = {(𝑥,𝑦)|𝑥, 𝑦 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑁 − 1}. 
[
𝑥𝑛
𝑦𝑛
] = [
1 𝑎
𝑏 𝑎𝑏 + 1
] [
𝑥𝑛−1
𝑦𝑛−1
]𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑁 
(10) 
where N represents the height or width of the square image processed; 
𝑥𝑛 and 𝑦𝑛 are the location coordinates of scrambled image’s pixels; 
𝑥𝑛−1 and 𝑦𝑛−1are the location coordinate of the original image pixels after n 
iterations, respectively, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are positive integers. 
In general, AT changes the position of pixels based on the number of iterations. The 
number of iterations taken is known as the Arnold period. The period depends on the 
image size (pixel values), and so for different image sizes, the Arnold period will be 
different (Peterson, 1997). After several iterations on the image, a disordered image is 
generated. As extra protection, the Arnold transformation can be adapted as a pre-
treatment method to encrypt the watermark data against copying and tempering (Ding 
and Jing, 2010). 
2.6 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON BIOMETRIC WATERMARKING TECHNIQUES 
This section looks at previous work on watermarking techniques within biometric 
systems, in particular within face recognition, in an effort to increase the level of 
security of the systems against attacks on the biometric as well as the watermarking 
systems. We begin by looking at work on watermarking techniques in general, before 
zooming in on their applications within face recognition systems. 
A summarized list of watermarking techniques on biometrics and their application 
domains is given in Appendix A. 
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2.6.1 Work on Biometric Watermarking Techniques 
Over the years, it is clear that a lot of work has been carried out on watermarking 
techniques, as improvements to existing techniques or as experiments on hybrid 
techniques. To help appreciate the development of the domain, the following is given in 
chronological order. These have also been chosen as they are the most relevant in the 
development of the work for this thesis, providing the groundwork for the contributions 
to be proposed. 
One of the earliest watermarked fingerprint recognition schemes was proposed by 
Pankanti and Yeung in 1999. They proposed an invisible fragile watermarking 
technique for image verification, especially for fingerprint recognition. They adapted 
the chaotic mixing digital watermarking technique, whereby mixing the watermark to a 
random-textured pattern would make the fingerprint images (captured in monochrome 
gray scales) more resilient against attacks. 
Ratha et al., (2000) proposed a robust data hiding algorithm based on the wavelet-
compressed domain for fingerprint images. The fingerprint image is converted to 
wavelet transform and then goes through a quantization process before being encoded 
using the Huffman algorithm, and completed with data compression. The proposed 
algorithm is simple and can be easily implemented on other types of images, such as 
medical and satellite images. However, the robustness and the fingerprint recognition 
rate of the proposed scheme was not investigated. 
Another well-known fingerprint watermarked scheme is from the work of Jain et al., 
(2002), which used a fingerprint image as the cover image and a face image as the 
hidden image. The authors used the Eigen-face coefficients of a user’s face and 
embedded them into selected minutiae of the fingerprint template. The verification rate 
for the scheme is shown to be identical to those for the original fingerprint image. In 
addition, the proposed scheme is robust against certain types of attacks, especially 
image cropping and JPEG compression. 
In Ahmed and Moskowitz, (2005), a robust watermarking technique for fingerprint 
images authentication is proposed, extending on their previous work, Phasemark, from 
image authentication to biometrics for forensic analysis. The authors used a Fourier 
frequency domain algorithm to generate a signature as the watermark data. 
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Moon et al., (2005) presented a biometric watermarking technique for user 
verification in remote multimodal biometric systems, concentrating on fingerprint and 
face information. The authors investigated the verification of a watermarked image 
under two scenarios. In the first, the fingerprint image is used as a cover image while 
the facial features are adopted as watermark data. In the second, the situation is 
reversed, with the face image as the cover image and the fingerprint features as hidden 
data. The experiments indicated that the second scenario performed better in terms of 
the watermarked image verification accuracy. However, there was no mention of which 
watermarking embedding technique was used. Moreover, the robustness of the proposed 
scheme was not investigated. The authors discussed the serious distortion of the face 
image as the value of watermark strength increases. Apparently, the imperceptibility of 
the face image is not important for replay attack prevention as long as the feature 
extraction module is able to extract the face features. This is a major point to be retained 
in various works later on. 
Chung et al., (2005) gave a similar concept paper, except this time the robustness of 
the proposed scheme was investigated. They also explored the dual watermarking 
technique, with experimental results showing that embedding a dual watermark would 
provide superior performance on the watermark detection accuracy. However, there is 
room for improvement on the robustness of the proposed scheme, such as against JPEG 
compression attacks. 
In the work of Vatsa et al., (2006), the authors combined the DWT (Discrete Wavelet 
Transform) domain with the LSB (Least Significance Bits) watermarking techniques to 
protect biometric data. The authors used the fingerprint image as a cover image and face 
template as the hidden message. The face template is converted to a 2D Gabor before 
embedding into the cover image. They tested the verification rate of the fingerprint 
based on minutiae matching, while the extracted face templates are matched using the 
texture based technique. They claimed that the proposed scheme (DWT + LSB) is 
robust to geometric and frequency attacks based on the verification rate. However, the 
watermark performance assessment was not done during this research. The robustness 
of the watermark (watermark modifications or removal) and the perceptual invisibility 
(how well the watermark conceals) should also be considered. The aim of the biometric 
watermarked image scheme is not only to maintain the verification rate, but must be 
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able to sustain the security and integrity of the watermark to ensure that the biometric 
data does belong to the genuine owner. 
Noore et al., (2007) proposed a fingerprint image watermarking algorithm using 
DCT. The proposed scheme is made up of multiple watermarks, face image and 
demographic text data, intended for protecting the fingerprint image from tempering. 
The quality of the extracted watermarks was investigated, giving very good results and 
can thus provide extra information for identification purposes. 
Zebbiche et al., (2008) proposed an efficient robust watermarking technique by 
embedding watermarks into the ridges area of fingerprint images, mainly because 
attackers are mostly interested in that area. The watermark was embedded using DCT 
and DWT watermarking techniques. The experiments conducted showed that the 
technique outperforms conventional techniques in terms of both embedding and 
robustness against known attacks such as filtering, noise and compression. 
In the research by Islam et al., (2008), a fingerprint image is also used as the cover 
image, but a palm print template is selected as the hidden message, and a DWT 
watermarking technique is used for the biometric data protection. The palm prints 
classification is carried out using the Wu et al. (2004) classification algorithm, which 
has the ability to classify palm prints into six categories according to the number of 
principal lines and the number of intersections. The hidden password derived from the 
palm prints classification is used in the embedding process to encrypt the watermarked 
template. Vulnerability attacks against the proposed fingerprint watermarked scheme 
were discussed, but the experiments were not performed by the authors. 
Hui et al., (2009) did a study on fingerprint watermarking for copyright protection. 
The fingerprint characteristics are embedded as multi-bit watermarks into the cover 
image using the spatial domain as well as the DCT watermarking technique. 
Experimental results showed that the proposed technique is feasible and effective. 
Yadav et al., (2011) proposed to secure biometric templates by using the Spatial 
Domain Techniques for Watermarking, adopting the Steganography Method known as 
the Parity Checked Method. For additional security the watermark is embedded four 
times, so that if an attacker forges one watermark, the other watermarks would remain 
intact. If the attackers were to modify or replace the secure biometric template, the 
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system will cue the database manager should the watermark be absent or present but at 
incorrect pixel positions. In the experiments conducted, the matching score between the 
secret and the enrolled templates is higher than the threshold value, which gives 
successful results for authentication even after the embedded of the watermark. One 
advantage of the proposed method is that precise control over the maximum difference 
between the original and watermarked content is possible, which allows the design of 
near-lossless watermarking systems. 
Geetha et al., (2011) presented a novel statistical attack invariant watermarking 
scheme for ownership protection by embedding an offline handwritten signature 
invisibly in the original image. The scheme employs a combination of DCT and SVD 
with LSB encoding for the watermarking embedding process. In the proposed DCT-
SVD watermarking scheme, the features of watermark signature is embedded in the first 
two bits of the LSBs in the Discrete Cosine Transform of the host image. The two 
dimensional DCT (2D-DCT) is applied to the original image and SVD is used to find 
the higher coefficients. This technique is highly robust against geometric attacks and 
other image processing operations. 
Reversible watermarking is another way in which both the original image and the 
hidden message or image can be perfectly recovered. Thampi and Jacob (2011) 
proposed using a rotational replacement of LSB reversible watermarking techniques as 
compared with Tian (2003) Different Expansion (DE) reversible watermarking 
techniques. In the rotational replacement of LSB, the original image as well as the 
watermark is first built into matrices and the original image matrix is divided into 
blocks. Each byte of watermark data can be embedded into one block. The replacement 
of the last row with the second last row data of the original image will be rotationally 
constructed until the first row is empty and one byte of watermark data can be placed in 
this row. The extraction process of the watermark is similar to alternately reconstructing 
the watermark by removing the first row of the LSB. The remaining rows are replaced 
in the reverse order of embedding until the watermark is entirely constructed. By 
measuring the quality using SSIM Index, the experimental results show that the 
rotational replacement of LSB is a better reverse watermarking scheme than DE. 
Bansal et al., (2012) proposed a novel hybrid technique to secure and authenticate a 
gray scale fingerprint image by watermarking with the corresponding grey scale facial 
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image using NN-PSO (Neural Network-Particle Swarm Optimization). The embedding 
process begins by dividing the original image into blocks. The feed forward NN (Neural 
Network) is used to define the number of secret bits based on the block features for each 
block. In the second part, a PSO (Particle Swarm Optimization) module is implemented 
to find the best DCT coefficient locations in that block where the secret data can be 
embedded. The hidden data can be extracted from the watermarked fingerprint image by 
reversing the process. The results showed that the proposed scheme is robust against a 
numbers of frequency and geometric attacks as well as maintained high perceptibility 
vis-à-vis the original image. 
From the literature review above, the first thing to note is that most researchers tend 
to hide biometric templates as a watermark to validate the ownership of the host image 
(Jain et al., 2002; Chen and Chang, 2005; Vatsa et al., 2006; Islam et al., 2008; Yan et 
al., 2010; Yadav et al., 2011; Thampi et al., 2011; Geetha et al., 2011; Bansal et al., 
2012;). This concept is called biometric watermarking, where a biometric template is 
employed as a watermark whereas the host can be any copyright document. On the 
other hand, where the host image is biometric data, and the watermark can be biometric 
or any other trademark (logo, name, id, and others), the approach is called 
watermarked biometrics. In recent years, several studies have focused on multimodal 
biometric watermarking techniques, i.e. using biometrics as both host and watermark. 
However, such techniques can be very costly and time consuming, as they need two or 
more devices for authentication. In addition, the vulnerabilities could be twice as much 
if the biometric images get captured, as the attacker would have access to multiple 
number of valid biometric information. 
More importantly, the literature review also reveals at least two issues that are still to 
be resolved, at least for watermarking in face recognition, as some of the investigations 
have yet to be thoroughly done: 
 One main concern is that researchers so far tend to concentrate on investigating 
only one area, leaving the other quite untouched, whereas both properties are 
important: 
 high biometric recognition level, or 
 high watermark detection watermark rate. 
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 Another point is that, given that most proposed solutions have been for fingerprint 
images, the main research objective has been for a secure scheme that does not 
degrade the quality of the cover image, which would reduce recognition accuracy. 
The minutiae features (ridge ending, bifurcation, short ridge) are important for 
fingerprint recognition to maintain the perceptibility of the image. However, for 
face recognition, the quality of the face image is not necessarily important as long 
as the feature extraction module is able to extract the necessary face features from 
the face image. 
2.6.2 Work on the implementation of Watermarking in Face Recognition Systems 
Unlike for work on watermarking in general, it has been found that only a few 
watermarked biometrics schemes have been proposed specifically for protecting face 
images (Tzouveli et al., 2002; Vatsa et al., 2004; Chen and Chang, 2005; Park et al., 
2007; Vatsa et al., 2007; Hoang et al., 2008; Salahi et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Ma et 
al., 2010; Yan and Liu, 2010; Zhang, 2011; Bedi et al., 2012; Isa and Aljareh, 2012; 
Behera and Govindan, 2013; Kekre et al., 2015; Isa et al., 2016). 
Tzouveli et al., (2002) proposed a robust watermarking scheme with a face detection 
method on real life images. The scheme detects the face region using a two dimensional 
Gaussian model of skin color distribution, and then the QSWT (Qualified Significant 
Wavelet Trees) as well as the DWT watermarking technique to embed the watermark in 
the selected area. The experimental results showed that the efficiency of the proposed 
face detection algorithm and the robustness of the watermarking scheme against various 
signal distortions were good. Unfortunately, the proposed scheme was not designed for 
biometric authentication systems, but rather for protecting the face area of real life 
images for copyright protection. The proposed scheme could possibly be enhanced so 
that it would be compatible with biometric authentication systems. 
A robust biometric watermarking scheme was proposed in Vatsa et al., (2005). It was 
to improve recognition accuracy and for protecting face and fingerprint images from 
tampering. The Multi-resolution Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) watermarking 
technique for embedding a face image into a fingerprint image was used. The quality of 
the extracted face image is enhanced using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm 
by selecting the best quality pixels from two extracted face images. Experimental results 
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showed that the fingerprint verification accuracy is maintained at a high level even 
under attacks. As for the extracted face images, the SVM improved by at least 10% for 
verification accuracy. 
Chen and Chang (2005) proposed a watermarking system for personal image 
copyright protection by embedding the owner’s eigenvalue information as a bar code 
image into different positions based on a SHA-1 sequence. Experiments showed that the 
imperceptibility value and the watermark detection rate are over the acceptable 
benchmark. Even though the proposed scheme indeed protects the cover image, again 
the scheme was not designed for nor experimented on biometric image authentication. 
Another interesting approach is found in Salahi et al., (2008), where a CT 
(Contourlet Transform) watermarking technique is used for securing face recognition 
systems. First, the face image is transformed in the CT domain at three levels, and then 
the smallest variance is selected for watermark embedding. A logo which is generated 
using a Walsh code is used as the hidden message. Experiments were conducted to 
calculate the performance of the face recognition system with and without 
watermarking under several attacks. The results show that the proposed scheme is 
robust against various attacks with the performance of the face recognition being hardly 
affected due to the watermark embedding. However, other face recognition algorithms 
were not tried with the CT domain watermarking technique to investigate their 
performance. This is a robust watermarking technique to cater for ownership 
authentication, but the embedding does not cover the entire face image, nor is there a 
check for the most appropriate places for embedding. Furthermore, it is also possible 
that the recognition rate is not affected because the watermark is embedded in a place 
from where the face features are not extracted for authentication. The image processing 
attacks used to investigate the robustness of the proposed scheme were also apparently 
not very strong, as the attacks did not deeply ruin the face image. 
Most image watermarking is performed using DWT. However, one of the major 
drawbacks of DWT is that the transformation does not provide for shift invariance 
because of the down-sampling of its bands. To address the problems of DWT based 
watermarking, Yan and Liu (2010) presented a 3-level RDWT (Redundant Discrete 
Wavelet Transform) biometric watermarking scheme. The proposed scheme first 
computes the embedding capacity of a face image by using an edge and corner phase 
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congruency method. RDWT decomposes a face image into four sub-bands such that the 
size of each sub-band is equal to the original image. The redundant space in RDWT 
provides for additional locations for embedding, and the watermarking scheme can be 
designed as such that the exact location for watermark embedding can be determined. 
Since the size of each RDWT sub-band is equal to the size of the input image, the three 
levels of the RDWT decomposition provide adequate capacity to embed the watermark 
data without affecting the edge and corner locations. Only the second and third levels of 
the RDWT are used for embedding because these two levels provide more resilience to 
geometric and frequency attacks. Extraction is simply the reverse of the embedding 
process. Experimental results show that the scheme is resilient to many different signal 
processing attacks. 
A fragile watermarking scheme was proposed in Zhang, (2011) that focuses on the 
facial image database in a face recognition system. The main objective is to protect the 
face images against tampering attacks by detecting the locations of any modifications. 
Experiments were conducted on the impact on recognition accuracy, detection rate, as 
well as the speed of face recognition with and without the watermark. The results from 
the experiments indicated that the scheme has a high recognition rate, sustains a good 
imperceptibility level of face images, as well as a high sensitivity level against 
tempering the watermarked facial images. 
Li et al., (2012) proposed a novel salient region based authentication watermarking 
scheme to protect biometric templates by embedding the watermark in the region of 
background (ROB) and the region of salient (ROI) to investigate the face recognition 
rate. Experimental results showed that the proposed scheme is able to detect any 
interfered area, and recover the original biometric features while maintaining the 
recognition rate. They also proposed a semi fragile biometric watermarking to protect a 
face image from tampering. It was shown that the recognition rate is very minimally 
affected due to the watermark embedding. 
Inamdar and Rege (2014) proposed a dual watermarking scheme for biometric data 
as copyright protection, where multiple biometric watermarks (speech and face 
biometric traits) of the owner are embedded as well as an offline signature is delicately 
overlaid on the cover image. Before embedding, speech is compressed using Linear 
Predictive Coding (LPC) and Gabor face is created from a face biometric trait. All three 
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watermarks Gabor face, LPC coefficients, and offline signature are the biometric 
characteristics of the owner and hence are highly related to the copyright holder. The 
proposed scheme is robust because as multiple watermarks are embedded in different 
areas of an image, at least one watermark should survive under watermarking attacks. 
In 2012, Isa and Aljareh proposed a watermarked face recognition scheme based on a 
DCT watermarking technique using the COX algorithm. According to Isa and Aljareh 
(2012), the embedded watermark did not degrade the face recognition rate of the PCA 
algorithm. The proposed scheme is applied to face images where the password of a 
given person is hidden in the corresponding image to authenticate him. In their latest 
work (Isa et al., 2016) proposed a blind robust watermarked face recognition scheme 
based on the combination of PCA as face recognition algorithm with the DCT 
watermarking technique to enhance the security of the face recognition system without 
degrading the recognition rate. The authors analyzed, in particular, the 8 vulnerable 
positions where data could be intercepted and/or resubmitted (Ratha, 2001), and 
proposed a mechanism for enhancing the level of security of the PCA face recognition 
system. 
From a rather thorough literature survey, it is found that previous research tends to 
protect the face image against certain threats on biometric authentication systems only 
in general, rather than trying to recognize and reject attempts to attack at specific points 
in the system. There is indeed a need for a watermarking technique that would able to 
cover the 8 positions described earlier against intentional attack, as given by Ratha et 
al., (2001). 
In summary (of the above and of the details in Appendix A), one sees that most 
researchers tend to focus on protecting the biometric image using additional biometric 
data for multimodal authentication. However, this would essentially provide protection 
only at certain positions (a and g in Figure 1,1), but not during the data transmission 
between modules. There is also a need to protect the face image against replay attacks at 
all possible vulnerable points while still maintaining the effectiveness of the face 
recognition system. 
Furthermore, most of the proposed biometric watermarking techniques tend to 
consider high imperceptibility of the biometric image as one of the major factors to be 
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accomplished. However, in biometric systems, the imperceptibility of the biometric 
image may not be that important as long as the feature extraction module can extract the 
biometric features from the image for authentication. With imperceptibility not being a 
major factor, then robustness of the watermark may be increased, as the two are usually 
inversely proportional. Other researchers have tried to balance these two factors to 
achieve a high recognition rate, but in our case we only need to focus on the robustness 
of the watermark as long as it does not impact the recognition rate. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an analysis of biometric authentication systems, with an 
emphasis on face recognition. Attention is also given to the approaches employed, and 
in particular, the viability of PCA as an appropriate technique. Threats to biometric 
authentication systems were investigated, with specific reference to the 8 threats 
highlighted by Ratha et al., (2001). As a means to enhance the level of security of 
biometric systems, watermarking is studied, covering the generic system, properties, 
possible attacks, applications, and most significantly the techniques. The literature 
reviewed not only encompass watermarking, but include the use of watermarking in 
relation to face recognition techniques. 
The study leads to a clear idea towards proposing a suitable combination of a face 
recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique, and contributes to the design of 
the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme aims at enhancing the security of face 
recognition authentication systems in terms of the authenticity of the data being 
transmitted. The scheme is explained and analyzed, tested and evaluated in the 
following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROPOSED WATERMARKED FACE RECOGNITION SCHEME 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis proposes a watermarked face recognition scheme to enhance the level of 
security in a face recognition system. This will be the core of this chapter and that of the 
thesis. The first main objective, which is to propose a suitable combination of a face 
recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique, and to show that the combination 
does not degrade the performance of the individual systems, will also be discussed here, 
together with the third main objective, being the robustness of the proposed 
watermarked face recognition scheme. All three proposals will be validated via five 
experiments to be presented in Chapter Four, with their set up being explained at the 
end of this chapter. 
3.2 Analysis 
3.2.1 Face Recognition and Watermarking 
A typical face recognition process is as shown in Figure 2.2 from Chapter Two. In 
the first stage of any face recognition system, faces are detected and extracted from 
raw images. The face image can be treated with a series of pre-processing techniques 
to minimize the face variants that could influence the recognition rate. Feature 
extraction is applied to extract facial features that can then be used for recognition and 
identification purposes. The most commonly used features in face recognition are 
eigenfaces (extracted from Principal Component Analysis, PCA) and the standard 
recognition algorithm is the Euclidean distance to match features.  
Face recognition systems are based on image processing, where a typical image 
processing process is as given in Figure 3.1. An original image is processed via some 
feature extraction process (as in Figure 2.2) to be stored as a spatial file (mainly 
pixels). The original image may be reproduced via some display function. 
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Figure 3.1: Image processing 
 
Digital watermarking is a process of information hiding by embedding additional 
information in the cover image that can later be extracted or detected for various 
purposes (e.g. for authentication, owner identification, protection and security of 
content and others). Since the aim of this research is to provide security of the face 
image content and to protect the face data from illegal users, we will use watermarking 
approaches in face recognition. The generic watermarking process is as illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 that includes both the encoding and decoding processes. There are two types 
of watermarking techniques – spatial and transform domains. The most commonly used 
digital watermarking technique is the spatial domain that works directly on pixels, such 
as Least Significant Bit (LSB). The transform domain technique is known to be more 
effective than the spatial domain, a well-known example being Discrete Cosine 
Transform (DCT) that modifies the transform domain coefficients. 
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Figure 3.2: Watermark embedding and decoding processes 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the stages of the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme 
that is robust to protect face images against replay attacks. For this illustration, we use 
PCA for face recognition and DCT for watermarking, with a logo and a timestamp as 
watermarks. 
 
Figure 3.3: Watermarking and Image Processing 
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 Firstly, PCA is applied on the image as part of the normal face recognition process, 
resulting in a spatial file as indicated earlier in Figure 3.1. Then DCT (a function, say D) 
takes the spatial file together with the watermarks (logo and timestamp) as input to 
produce a non-spatial file (in frequencies), upon which some transformation of 
coefficients are carried out to embed the watermarks. The resulting file (watermarked 
data, as indicated in Figure 3.2) is reconverted into a spatial file to continue with the 
face recognition process. 
 It is to be noted that the application of the display function on this output spatial file 
will of course produce an image different from the original image. Nonetheless, 
watermarking algorithms are always designed to be invertible, and so (if needed) the 
inverse function (D
-1
) would be able to reproduce the original input spatial file, and 
subsequently the original image via the same display function. D
-1 
can be seen as the 
arrow from the watermarked Spatial++ (pixels) file on the right hand side of Figure 3.3 
to the Spatial (pixels) file on the left hand side – it would be as if DCT had never taken 
place. This is simply an illustration to show that one can get the original image if ever 
needed. 
The underlying idea of using watermarks is that the face recognition algorithm will 
now be working on watermarked images rather than the original images, whereupon 
there will be additional modules to always verify the watermarks at any instance within 
the face recognition process. The key is then to determine how exactly the chosen 
watermarks will be able to enhance the security of the face recognition process. 
3.2.2 DCT algorithm does not degrade the accuracy of PCA algorithm 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is one of the most successful algorithms in 
image recognition and compression. The main purpose of PCA is to reduce the data 
space utilized to a significantly smaller dimension. In a face recognition environment, 
PCA is adopted to help in the face image feature space reduction and in the 
classification process. 
Face recognition algorithm are divided into two main categories: feature-based and 
holistic approaches. In feature-based approaches, the geometric measurements among 
facial points (eyes, mouth, nose and others) are computed and converted into a vector of 
geometric features, which are then used for recognition. PCA falls within the holistic 
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approach category, where a face is recognized using global information on face images 
rather than local features. As holistic approaches use global face image information for 
recognition, the quality of the face image is not very critical as long as the feature 
extractor module is able to extract the features from the biometric traits and if the 
recognition rate is reasonably high. 
Watermarking techniques are also divided into two main categories: spatial domain 
and frequency domain. Spatial domain techniques operate directly on the pixels of an 
image, thus embedding the watermark in the pixel file. On the other hand, frequency 
domain techniques convert pixels into frequencies, and watermarks are embedded 
within the frequencies. DCT falls within the frequency domain approach, where it 
converts image processing data from the spatial domain to the frequency domain into a 
summation of a series of cosine waves oscillating at different frequencies. 
In general, the high frequencies are prone to compression and noise attacks, whereas 
the low frequencies are more visible to human eyes but are more robust to image 
processing attacks. Since the imperceptibility of the face image is not critical as long as 
the feature extraction module is able to recognize the face, the low frequency band is 
arguably a more appropriate choice for watermark embedding. 
When watermarking is used to enhance security in a biometric system, in this case in 
a face recognition system, it is important to show that the combination does not degrade 
each other’s performance, in particular in terms of accuracy. In our case, we need to 
ensure that DCT does not degrade the performance of PCA, and vice versa.  
On this point, analytical results validated by experiments as presented by Weilong, 
Meng and Shiqian (2005) have shown that when DCT is first applied on a pixel file to 
obtain a frequency domain file (with changes in coefficients), and then followed by the 
application of PCA for compression as well as reconverting to an image (compressed 
file), the result is the same as that of a direct application of PCA on the original pixel 
file. This is as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
This result would mean that it safe to say that DCT does not degrade the performance 
of PCA, at least in terms of the accuracy of face recognition, should there be a need to 
introduce watermarking at certain points of the face recognition system. This claim is 
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towards the first main objective of the thesis, and will be validated by an experiment in 
Chapter Four. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: DCT does not disturb the accuracy of PCA 
The top and right hand part of Figure 3.4 is path 1 in Figure 3.5. Ideally, we would 
want to have the same analytical results both ways, namely also for the application of 
DCT following an application of PCA – path 2 in Figure 3.5 – which would then show 
that PCA also does not degrade the accuracy of DCT. Proving this result, i.e. path 2, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and so we will conduct experiments to show some form 
of validation of this result. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: DCT and PCA do not degrade the accuracy of each other 
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3.3 Design 
3.3.1 Proposed secure watermarked face recognition scheme 
We now move on to the second and most important main objective of this thesis, 
which is to propose a watermarked face recognition scheme to enhance the level of 
security in a face recognition system. First, we relook at the standard face recognition 
algorithm process, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, which is an extension of Figure 2.2 in 
view of how a face recognition algorithm would work on watermarked images. 
 
Figure 3.6: Face recognition process 
 
Face recognition systems essentially match a captured image of a subject (S) to an 
image of an approved/certified person, referred to as the object (O), the latter being 
stored in some facial database. To do this, there is a feature extraction module that 
works on the image of the subject, and the same is done for the targeted object (the 
target object is determined by some means, perhaps by tagging a smart card carrying the 
identity of the subject). A matching algorithm (Matcher) is then used to match the 
extracted features (face features/ spot ‘a’ and face features/ spot ‘b’), resulting with an 
approval if there is a match, and a rejection otherwise. 
Figure 3.7 gives an overall picture of the use of watermarking in a face recognition 
system. Watermarks are embedded into the image of the subject (with the method 
shown in Figure 3.3) as soon as it is captured, and the same is done for the object image 
once retrieved from the database. In some cases, part of the watermark may have 
already been embedded earlier for various reasons (in this illustration, the logo would 
have already been embedded in all object images upon storage). This is then followed 
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by the feature extraction process on both sides, resulting in their respective spatial files, 
upon which the matching algorithm will work (position a’ and position b’). In essence, 
the matching is exactly like the matching on the features of the original images (position 
a and position b), except these features have been in a sense transformed to include the 
watermarks (position a’ and position b’) – albeit not done directly. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Watermarking in face recognition systems 
 
The main thing to note here is that the matching should give exactly the same results 
(approval or rejection) as with the original face recognition process because exactly the 
same face recognition algorithm is used, and also due to the following: 
 Exactly the same watermarks are embedded into both the subject and object 
images 
 The same original face recognition feature extraction algorithm is used on both 
ends 
 The same original face recognition matching algorithm is used. 
Now, it remains to see how the watermarking technique will enhance security. The 
proposed watermarked face recognition scheme makes use of two different watermarks: 
 Logo 
 Timestamp 
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The logo serves as in any other watermarking technique that embeds particular 
images within object images. The main purpose is usually to identify genuine images 
within the database of objects. However, in this proposed work, it will be seen further 
on that it is also used to identify captured images. 
The timestamp is the main security enhancer, as it will be used as a form of session 
ID. Any image captured from within the process and resubmitted later will be 
immediately recognized as coming from a different session and will be rejected. In 
addition, like the logo, it can also be used to identify captured images by its mere 
existence within the image. 
In order to check on the coverage of the proposed watermarked face recognition 
scheme, Figure 3.8 depicts the proposed scheme indicating the places where the 
watermarks are present within the system, and most importantly the positions where 
attackers can capture biometric data from within the system and then resubmit it at the 
same or at other positions. 
 
Figure 3.8: The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme 
The diagram indicates that data may be captured from any of the 8 positions a, b, c. 
d, e, f, g, h, and then resubmitted at the same place or at any other position, which gives 
rise to 8x8 = 64 situations. We will look at all these situations within a single table 
below (Table 3.1). First, scope-wise, two key points about the proposed scheme are to 
be noted: 
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 It covers only situations where data has been captured (i.e. stolen) from and 
reintroduced into the system, and NOT when fresh data is introduced from 
outside the system. 
 It also covers only situations where the watermark has been introduced, which 
means only the points that are expecting watermarks are covered. 
The above means that the following situations are excluded, and may be left for 
future work. 
 Presenting a printed image to the scanner: 
— A fresh image is shown to the scanner (camera), possibly a 
picture of an authorised person. In this situation, the scanner has 
to recognise that it is a printed image, and not that of a physical 
person. There is a need for a good method for this, but in the 
meantime, CCTVs may be deployed to monitor such a situation. 
— Images are captured from the scanner (position a) before the 
watermark is embedded. The images are printed, and then 
placed in front of the scanner. This can happen if the scanner 
has a memory, which can and perhaps should be removed. In 
any case, this situation is similar to the above (fresh image). 
 The approval code is captured at position h and resubmitted later on at 
the same position. This requires different forms of protection, certainly 
not by watermarking. As such, position h will not be considered in this 
proposal, leaving a total of 7 positions. 
From these, and also in general, a few additional positions can be noted: 
 In as much as data may be captured from any of the 7 remaining 
positions, there is nothing to gain by resubmitting the captured data at 
positions e, f and g, as these positions transmit or store authenticating 
data and not the one to be authenticated – which then reduces the total 
number of situations to be checked down to 7x4 = 28. 
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 In verifying the security in these 28 situations, it is important to note the 
types of data that are present at the 7 remaining positions: 
 Image only (of subject) 
 Image with watermarks logo and timestamp (of subject) 
 Features including those of the watermarks logo and 
timestamp (of subject) 
 Features including those of the watermarks logo and 
timestamp (of subject and object) 
 Features including those of the watermarks logo and 
timestamp (of object) 
 Image with watermarks logo and timestamp (of object) 
 Image with watermark logo only (of object) 
The above lead to two fundamental points that underlie the proposed watermarked 
face recognition scheme: 
 Any image captured from anywhere other than from position a will 
already have a watermark embedded (at least a logo), and its presence 
can be readily detected. As such, the image can be immediately rejected 
if it is resubmitted at position a. 
 Data captured from one position may have to be processed externally 
before resubmitting at another position. For example, for an image 
captured from position a, to be resubmitted at positions c or d will have 
to have its features extracted before being resubmitted. However, apart 
from positions a and g, all data would have the timestamp watermark, 
and so a later resubmission (as a subject) will not tally with the 
timestamp of the object watermark. 
With all the above points well-noted, we can now proceed to present how the 28 
situations are secured, as given in Table 3.1 below. 
This would cover the second main objective of this thesis, and as with the first main 
objective presented in 3.2, the claim will also be validated via an experiment in Chapter 
Four. 
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Table 3.1: The 28 situations which need to be secured and protected 
Situation Data captured 
from position 
Data 
resubmitted at 
position 
Type of data captured Type of data resubmitted Security mechanism Status 
1 a A face image  
(no watermark) 
face image  
(no watermark) 
reject if there is an existing watermark Resolved 
2 a B face image  
(no watermark) 
face image  
(no watermark) 
reject if there is an existing watermark Resolved 
3 a C face image  
(no watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (no watermark) 
will not match with the object as there are 
no features of the watermark 
Resolved 
4 a D face image  
(no watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (no watermark) 
will not match with the object as there are 
no features of the watermark 
Resolved 
 a E  
Resubmission only up to position d  a F 
 a G 
5 b A face image  
(with watermark) 
face image 
(with watermark) 
reject if there is an existing watermark Resolved 
6 b B face image  
(with watermark) 
face image  
(with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
7 b C face image  
(with watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
8 b D face image  
(with watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
 b E  
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 b F Resubmission only up to position d 
 b G 
9 c A features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
10 c B features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
11 c C features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
12 c D features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
 c E  
Resubmission only up to position d  c F 
 c G 
13 
 
d A features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
14 d B features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
15 d C features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
16 d D features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
 d E  
Resubmission only up to position d  d F 
 d G 
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17 e A features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
18 e B features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features extraction is a form of 
non-reversible compression 
Not relevant  
19 e C features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
20 e D features  
(inc. of watermark) 
features  
(inc. of watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
 e E  
Resubmission only up to position d  e F 
 e G 
21 f A face image  
(with watermark) 
face image  
(with watermark) 
reject if there is an existing watermark Resolved 
22 f B face image  
(with watermark) 
face image  
(with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
23 f C face image  
(with watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
24 f D face image  
(with watermark) 
extract face features from face 
image (with watermark) 
reject if timestamp does not tally Resolved 
 f E  
Resubmission only up to position d  f F 
 f G 
25 g A face image  face image  reject if there is an existing watermark Resolved 
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(with logo) (with logo) (logo) 
26 g B face image  
(with logo) 
face image  
(with logo) 
will not match with the object as there are 
no features of the timestamp 
Resolved 
27 g C face image  
(with logo) 
extract face features from face 
image (with logo) 
will not match with the object as there are 
no features of the watermark 
Resolved 
28 g D face image  
(with logo) 
extract face features from face 
image (with logo) 
will not match with the object as there are 
no features of the watermark 
Resolved 
 g E  
Resubmission only up to position d  g F 
 g G 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the three main objectives of the thesis. The first is the PCA-DCT 
combination as a more secure face recognition system, and in particular the relationship 
between image processing and watermarking to justify that the DCT watermarking 
technique will not degrade the performance of the PCA recognition rate. The second, being 
the core of this chapter and the thesis, is the proposed watermarked face recognition 
scheme to enhance the level of security in a face recognition system. Thirdly is the 
robustness of the proposed watermarking scheme. The experiment set up and the actual 
experiments for five experiments to validate these three proposals, their results, analysis 
and discussion, will be presented in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPLEMENTATION, TEST AND EVALUATION 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in CHAPTER THREE, the claims towards the first and second main 
objectives of the thesis will be validated via experiments to be presented in this chapter. 
The third main objective of the thesis, being the robustness of the proposed watermarking 
scheme will also be carried out via an experiment, with the addition of two other 
experiments that are needed to support these three main experiments. 
This chapter then presents the five evaluation experiments for the proposed scheme: 
1) Determining the frequency band for watermarking  
2) Non degradation of PCA and DCT due to the combination 
3) Replay attack prevention – system rejection of captured data  
─ Illegitimate presence of watermarks (logo) 
─ Timestamp does not tally 
─ Value of features do not match (based on the face recognition system) 
─ Additional: Logo does not exist (for fresh data) 
4) Robustness of the watermark scheme 
5) Comparative study of watermarking techniques 
Experiment 3 is for the second main objective of this thesis, and it is the core of this 
thesis. Experiment 2 is towards the first main objective of the thesis, supported by 
Experiment 5, as the said objective also includes a proposal for a secure face recognition 
and watermarking combination. Experiment 1 is a pre-requisite for all the other 
experiments, while Experiment 4 is towards the third main objective of the thesis. 
All the experiments are conducted using the Database of Faces (ORL, 2002) at AT&T 
Laboratories, Cambridge University. The database contains a set of face images of forty 
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persons with ten different images for each person. The images were taken at different times, 
with various lighting conditions, different facial expressions (open /closed eyes, 
open/closed mouth, smiling/unsmiling and others) and dissimilar facial details (glasses/ no 
glasses). All the images were taken against a dark homogeneous background with the 
subjects in an upright and frontal position. The size of each image is 92x112 pixels with 
256 grey levels per pixel in PGM format. 
 
4.2 Experiment Set Up 
As the basis for setting up the experiments, recall that the proposed watermarked face 
recognition scheme is aimed at enhancing security in a face recognition system, in 
particular against data captured from within the system. We refer to the earlier Figure 
3.8, where the critical positions of the system are shown, and where the watermarks (logo 
and timestamp) are present. In general, data may be captured from any of the positions a, b, 
c, d, e, f, g, h. Recall also that resubmission (after possible additional external 
processing/tampering) would only happen at positions a, b, c, d, as resubmissions at 
positions e, f, g would be of no interest since these positions transmit the images of 
verifying data and not data to be verified. 
Recall also that fresh data introduced from outside is out of the scope of this thesis, but 
this would only be reasonably introduced at points a, g and h, as all the other points would 
be secured by the presence of watermarks. At point a, the system would have to be able to 
detect that the image introduced is not captured from a human, but rather via a printed 
image in front of the camera, or as a digital image before the watermarks are introduced. 
[The case for point a after the watermark has been embedded, and the case for point g, are 
covered later on as an additional check.] In addition, an approval code stolen at point h and 
later reintroduced also at point h is also out of the scope of this thesis, as it does not involve 
any watermarking (unless, of course, if the same watermarking and verification technique is 
also used on approval codes, and not just on images and their corresponding features). 
The set up for the five experiments will now be presented in turn. 
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4.2.1 Experiment 1 - Determining the frequency band for watermarking 
This experiment is to determine the best frequency band to place the watermarks in an 
image. Watermarking techniques are commonly distinguished based on two watermarking 
domains: Spatial Domain and Transform (frequency) Domain (Gaurav et al., 2012).  
The underlying concept of the spatial domain (Cheung, 2000) is to embed a watermark 
into an image by modifying the grey value of certain pixels in the image (Ramkumar, 2000; 
Navas, Sasikumar and Sreevidya, 2007). The classical methods are to modify the last 
significant bits (LSB) of specific pixels of the host image based on the watermark bits 
(Wang, Pan and Jain, 2009). For the transform domain, the underlying concept is to embed 
a watermark via the frequency coefficients of the transformed image using discrete cosine 
transform (DCT), discrete wavelet transform (DWT) (Vetterli, 1995), or some other kind of 
transform techniques (Shih, 2008; Wang, Pan and Jain, 2009). The frequency coefficients 
are very slightly adjusted, which makes it more robust against attacks, and that the changes 
are quite unnoticeable. However, they are more difficult to implement and the computer 
resources required tend to be more expensive. 
DCT is a conversion technique of a signal into elementary frequency components (Rao 
et al., 1990). It converts an image to a sum of varying magnitudes and frequencies. The 
output array of DCT coefficients contains integers, which can range from -1024 to 1023. 
Most DCT-based watermarking techniques segment an image into non-overlapping blocks 
and applies DCT to each block. This would split the converted block into three different 
frequency sub-bands: low frequency, middle frequency and high frequency, Shoemaker 
(2002), as illustrated in Figure 2.8 earlier in Chapter Two. 
DCT-based watermarking is based on two well-known facts. The first is that the high 
frequencies are more prone to compression and noise attacks, while the second is that the 
low frequencies are more visible to human eyes but are more robust to image processing 
attacks. To balance these two advantages/disadvantages, most watermarking schemes tend 
to embed the watermark at the middle frequency sub-band so that the image perceptibility 
will not be very much affected while at the same time the watermark cannot be readily 
removed through compression or noise attacks (Deng and Wang, 2003). However, for 
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biometric systems, since the imperceptibility of the face image is not critical as long as the 
feature extraction module is able to recognize the face, the low frequency band would 
arguably be more appropriate for watermark embedding. 
This experiment is to show that the embedding of watermarks does not degrade the 
accuracy of the face recognition system (accuracy of recognition). Equally fundamental, the 
watermark detection rate must also be investigated to ensure that the face image had been 
watermarked correctly, and in particular the timestamps can be retrieved accurately 
(watermark detection/ recognition). 
Before these, in order to determine which frequency bands give the best results for 
attaining a high face recognition accuracy rate as well as a high watermark detection rate, a 
watermark logo and a timestamp are embedded into each frequency band. Both these 
properties are then measured by increasing the strength value of the watermarking scheme, 
based on the fact that the quality of the face images would be increasingly disturbed as the 
strength value increases. At a particular strength value, the watermark detection rate and 
face recognition rate would decrease, and this would be recognised as the threshold. 
Given the above, measures for accuracy of recognition and watermark 
detection/recognition are required, whereby the following are used. 
a)  Accuracy of face recognition 
The performance of face recognition can be measured based on the similarity 
between each of the training watermarked face images in the database against the 
test images. The Euclidean distance ‖𝑦1 − 𝑦2‖ is chosen to measure the similarity 
between both images. The highest similarity score indicates a face matched in the 
training set. The similarity score is based on the inverse Euclidean distance, which 
is defined as follows: 
FR(𝑦1, 𝑦2) =
1
1 + ‖𝑦1 − 𝑦2‖
 𝜖[0,1] 
(11) 
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where 𝑦1is the weight of test image and 𝑦2 is the distance of training image. 
b) Watermark detection/recognition 
Normalized Correlation (NC) is selected to compare the original embedded 
watermark with the extracted watermark of watermarked image. NC is measured 
between 0 and 1. The nearer the NC value to 1, the better is the watermark detection 
rate. The calculation for NC is as follows: 
 𝑁𝐶 =  
∑ ∑ 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑗 ?̃?(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑖
∑ ∑ [𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)]2𝑗𝑖
    
(12) 
where 𝑊(𝑖, 𝑗)is the original embedded watermark and ?̃?(𝑖, 𝑗) is the extracted 
watermark from watermarked image. 
 
4.2.2 Experiment 2 - Non degradation 
This experiment is to validate the claim that the use of DCT will not degrade PCA-based 
face recognition, and vice versa. 
Repeating the earlier explanation and also Figure 3.5 within Figure 4.1 below, the 
analytical result validated by experiments as presented by Weilong, Meng and Shiqian 
(2005) is shown as path 1 in the Figure 3.5. This experiment will be repeated in Chapter 
Four. An experiment will also be conducted for the application of DCT following an 
application of PCA, i.e. path 2, which would then show that PCA also does not degrade the 
accuracy of DCT (albeit only by experimentation). 
The difference between the earlier Figure 3.5 and Figure 4.1 is the right end, which will 
be explained shortly. 
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Figure 4.1: Experiment 2- DCT and PCA do not degrade each other 
The experiment will carry out both paths with the same input images, and to show that 
the results are identical. Since PCA has been shown not to degrade DCT (Path 1), identical 
results (from Path 2) would indicate that DCT also does not degrade PCA.  
Referring to Figure 4.1 above, first note that both paths result in essentially compressed 
coefficient files. For Path 1, the DCT produces frequencies, which are then compressed by 
the PCA (Compressed Frequency 1). For Path 2, the PCA compresses the image file, and 
the DCT produces the frequencies of the compressed file (Compressed Frequency 2). These 
two files are technically quite different, but equality may be shown by reconverting the files 
resulting from both paths into pixel files and then compare them to the respective original 
input images (hence the right end of the above figure). For this comparison, the structural 
similarity (SSIM) index is used. 
The SSIM index is based on the concept of full reference image quality assessment 
(Wang et al., 2004). The SSIM index is calculated for various types of images, such as to 
check on the preservation of the quality of digital television and cinematic pictures, as well 
as for digital images and videos in general. The SSIM index is calculated on the various 
windows of an image. The measure is between two windows  of common size N×N from 
two given images x and y where the SSIM index compares local patterns of pixel intensities 
that have been normalized for luminance, contrast and structure, and it is defined as 
follows: 
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SSIM(x, 𝑦) =
(2𝜇𝑥𝜇𝑦 + 𝐶1)(2𝜎𝑥𝑦 + 𝐶2)
(𝜇𝑥2 + 𝜇𝑦2 + 𝐶1)(𝜎𝑥2 + 𝜎𝑦2 + 𝐶2)
 
(13) 
where 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜇𝑦  are respectively the means of the signals for x and y, 𝜎𝑥 and 𝜎𝑦 are the 
standard deviations of the signals for x and y, while 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 are constants with values 
much smaller than 1. 𝜎𝑥𝑦 is the estimated correlation coefficient of the signals for x and y. 
A SSIM(x, y) value of 1 would mean the images x and y are completely identical, but for 
this experiment, a threshold value of 0.85 would already suffice. 
 
4.2.3 Experiment 3 - System Rejection 
First and foremost, it is to be noted that data captured from the following positions will 
have the given contents (data captured from positions a and h are out of the scope of this 
thesis): 
Table 4.1: The contents of captured data from position b to position g 
b c d e f g 
Subject Subject Subject & Object Object Object Object 
Image Features Features Features Image Image 
Logo Logo Logo Logo Logo Logo 
Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp  
 
The above means that only the following combinations of capturedresubmissions are 
possible: 
 Captured at Resubmission at  
 b, f, g  a Requires image 
 b, f, g b Requires image 
 c, d, e c Requires features 
 c, d, e d Requires features 
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In general, as given by an earlier table 3.1, the system will reject captured data at the 
resubmission positions, namely a, b, c, d, and based on the following: 
Table 4.2: The main basis in experiment 4.2.3 - system rejection 
Rejection by Captured at Resubmission at Rejection at 
Illegitimate presence of logo b, f, g a a 
Timestamp does not tally b, f, g b b 
Value of features do not match  
(based on the face recognition system) 
c, d, e c, d d 
The table 4.2 above will be the main basis for the experiments: 
— Illegitimate presence of watermarks (logo) 
— Timestamp does not tally 
— Value of features do not match (based on the face recognition system) 
 
There is also an additional check for fresh data submitted at a and g:  
— Additional: Logo does not exist. 
The following provide more details. 
a) Rejection 1 - Illegitimate presence of logo (at position a) 
 
Any captured data (apart from those captured at position a) will already have the 
watermarks. Any image submitted at position a that already has a watermark will be 
immediately rejected. 
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Figure 4.2: Illegitimate presence of logo 
b)  Rejection 2 - Timestamp does not tally (at position b) 
The timestamp is one of the most crucial mechanisms adopted for the proposed 
watermarked face recognition scheme. The function of the timestamp is similar to a 
session id where the current time, as well as the unique module id, is captured and 
embedded as watermarks at position a before the face data is submitted through the 
transmission channel. The purpose of the timestamp watermark is to validate that 
the current face data is fresh and it is not one captured from an earlier session and 
then resubmitted back into the system.  
 
Figure 4.3: Timestamp is no tally 
c)  Rejection 3 - Feature values do not match (at position d) 
The timestamp watermark is also key for resubmissions of captured data at 
positions c and d. Should they carry a different timestamp than the current time, the 
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features of that timestamp would certainly not match the features of the current 
timestamp carried by the verifying image coming from the database. This matching 
is simply done by the face recognition system. 
 
Figure 4.4: Features value does not matched 
d)  Additional - Logo does not exist (at positions a, g) 
The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme embeds a logo watermark at 
two positions: in position a once the face image is captured at the sensor, and during 
the enrolment process after a certified face image gets stored in the database at 
position g. The existence of the logo watermark is checked at positions a and g as 
validation towards two scenarios. First, if an attacker tries to submit his own face 
image at position a (after the system is supposed to have embedded the watermark), 
the system will check for the existence of the logo, and if it does not exist, the 
system will reject the face data transmission. At position g is when an attacker 
wants to submit a face image into the face database. Again, the system will reject 
the update of the face database if there is no embedded logo.  
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Figure 4.5: Additional rejection - logo does not exist 
 
4.2.4 Experiment 4 - Robustness 
The needs for more robust watermarking schemes are required to survive watermarking 
attacks. Robustness has become a key issue in watermarking techniques. Hidden watermark 
images should remain intact even if the cover image may be disturbed due to attacks. 
According to Barni et al. (1998), the watermark embedded using the DCT technique is 
robust to several signal processing techniques, such as: 
i. JPEG compression 
ii. low pass and median filtering 
iii. addition of Gaussian noise 
In this research, the robustness of the watermark scheme also needs to be investigated to 
ensure that the watermark cannot be easily removed by an attacker.  
The highest recognition rates for accuracy of face recognition and watermark detection 
will determine which frequency band to choose for embedding the watermark. Similar to 
the detection experiment in (b), NC is also selected to measure the robustness of a 
watermarked image. The watermarked image is exposed to various attacks for evaluation, 
and the closer the NC value is to 1, the more robust the watermarked image is, and the 
extracted watermark will then be considered well preserved. 
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4.2.5 Experiment 5 - Comparative study of watermarking techniques 
The watermarking technique used in this research is DCT. This experiment is carried out 
to validate this choice. Three of the most used watermarking techniques are compared: 
— Spatial: LSB 
— Transform (or frequency) 
 DCT 
 DWT 
In the comparison, the same three accuracy rates of recognition, detection and 
robustness are tested using the same measures FR and NC as described above. 
 
4.3 Validation – Experiments 
We are now in a position to conduct the five experiments. However, first recall that one 
of the main purposes of our proposed scheme is for countering replay attacks with a robust 
blind watermarking technique to protect the biometric traits from being re-used (replayed) 
by attackers. The face image can be protected against such an attack by placing the 
watermark in the area where the face feature extraction happens. As such, the proposed 
scheme should meet the following goals: 
 Reject face images that have been captured and resubmitted later at any position in 
the biometric authentication system. 
 Retain the recognition rate for watermarked face images to maintain the 
effectiveness of the biometric authentication system. 
In the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, the Viola and Jones algorithm 
(Viola and Jones, 2004) is adopted for the face detection algorithm, and the PCA for the 
feature extraction technique. The Viola and Jones algorithm is very effective for the 
localization of the spatial extent of the face and to determine its boundaries. The algorithm 
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was observed to perform reasonably well on the face images used in this work. PCA has 
been chosen as the feature extraction algorithm because PCA has proven to be very 
effective for information compression, and several researchers have also shown that PCA 
performs better in face recognition when the training data set is small, which is our case. 
In the biometric authentication system, the sensor, which in our case is a camera, 
captures the face image and embeds a watermark before transmitting it to the feature 
extraction module. At the feature extraction module, the watermark is extracted and 
validated. If the watermark can be extracted properly and matches correctly, only then the 
feature extraction module can begin its task. The feature extraction module then passes its 
results to the Matcher, which matches the results with a targeted set of features obtained 
from the database of certified images. 
The aim of watermarking is to ensure ownership protection of the face image. This 
approach prevents an attacker from trying to inject a sniffed face image (and possibly 
subsequently modified) into the communication channel between the sensor and the feature 
extraction module, or between the feature extraction module and the matcher – namely at 
the positions a, b, c and d in the diagram given earlier in Figure 3.8. 
As the embedded watermark is robust, slight changes to modify the face image would 
also disturb the watermark as well as the face recognition rate. A similar approach is 
applied in the face database environment. In the scenario where an attacker tries to use a 
sniffed face image to fool the sensor (i.e. print the sniffed face image and show it to the 
camera), the face detection module will not be able to detect the face area, mainly because 
the embedded watermark would have disturbed the perceptibility of the sniffed face image. 
 
4.3.1 General Modules 
The five experiments will be presented in turn further below, but first we present the two 
most critical modules utilized in the system – the watermark embedding module and the 
watermark extraction module. 
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a) Watermark embedding module 
The overall watermark embedding process is illustrated in Figure 4.6, and the details of 
the steps are as follows. 
Step 1.  
Read the face image and the watermark image. 
 
Step 2.  
Transform the watermark image into binary and convert the binary watermark 
sequence into an Arnold Transform (AT). The AT is used in order to protect the 
watermark against intentional reconstruction by intruders. 
Step 3.  
Detect the face area using the Viola Jones technique. 
 
Figure 4.6: Watermark embedding process 
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Step 4.  
Divide the face area image into 8x8 blocks, and convert each block into a DCT 
transform. 
Step 5.   
Protect against compression. In order to protect the watermark against JPEG 
compression, each DCT coefficient from every block is quantized using the quantization 
table of the JPEG compression standards. (See Figure 4.7) 
16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61 
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55 
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56 
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62 
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77 
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92 
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101 
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99 
 
Figure 4.7: Quantization table recommended in the JPEG specification 
 
Step 6.  
Choose the frequency band for watermark embedding to be done in Step 7. [This 
frequency band is decided based on Experiment 1 – see below.] 
Step 7.  
Choose the robustness level for watermark embedding [This watermark strength 
value is decided based on Experiment 4.] Then execute watermark embedding. For this, 
let C(k,l) be the DCT coefficients in the chosen frequency range, R the modulus, P the 
mathematical remainder of |C(k,l)| with 𝑃 ∈ {0,1,2,… . , 𝑅 − 1}, and the other variables 
be declared via the formulae as given below. The value of R is a predefined constant and 
is used as a reference threshold. The higher the value of R, the higher the level of 
robustness of the method, but the quality of the watermarked image decreases. The value 
of R is chosen in such a way so as to obtain a balance between robustness and the face 
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recognition rate, which apparently also depends on image quality. 
𝑃 = |𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)| 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑅; 
 
if watermark bit = 0: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑃 ≥ 3 ×
𝑅
4
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) − 𝑃 + 5 ∗
𝑅
4
 
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑃 < 3 ∗
𝑅
4
&& 𝑃 ≥ 2 ∗
𝑃
4
 
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) − 𝑃 +
𝑅
4
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) 
 
if watermark bit = 1: 
                   
𝑖𝑓 𝑃 ≪
𝑅
4
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) − 𝑃 −
𝑅
4
 
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑃 >
𝑅
4
&& 𝑃 ≪ 2 ∗
𝑅
4
 
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) − 𝑃 + 3 ∗
𝑅
4
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 
𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙)∗ = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) 
 (11) 
 
Step 8.  
Repeat steps 6 and 7 until the entire watermark is successfully embedded into the 
remaining blocks. Apply inverse DCT to each block to construct the watermarked face 
image.  
b) Watermark extraction module  
The overall watermark extraction process is illustrated in Figure 4.8, and the details of 
the steps are given after that. 
The watermark extraction steps are very closely related to the watermark embedding 
steps. In essence, the watermark can be extracted by reversing the embedding steps 
provided the location of the embedded watermark is known. As the scheme is based on 
blind watermarking concepts, the original image is not needed as a reference. There are two 
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variables needed for extraction: the locations of the watermark bits and the value of the 
modulus R. The extracted bits are assembled to obtain the watermark pattern and then the 
inverse Arnold transformation is applied.  
 
Figure 4.8: Watermark extraction process 
Step 1.  
Detect the face area of the watermarked face image. 
Step 2.  
Divide the watermarked image into 8x8 blocks and convert each block into the DCT 
frequency domain. 
Step 3.  
Extract the watermark bits using the equation below and the embedded watermark 
location. Let C(k,l)* be the DCT chosen frequency coefficients of the embedded 
watermark, eb the extracted watermark bit, and R the modulus. 
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𝑒𝑏 =
{
 
 
 
   0, 𝑖𝑓 (𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑅) <
𝑅
2 
 1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝐶(𝑘, 𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑅) ≥
𝑅
2
 
(12) 
 
Step 4.  
Repeat steps 2 and 3 on each block until all watermark bits have been extracted and 
concatenated into a watermark pattern.  
Step 5.  
Inverse the watermark pattern with the Arnold transformation. 
Step 6.  
Reconstruct the watermark pattern to obtain the extracted watermark. 
The watermark embedding and extraction processes are used at runtime as well as in all 
the five experiments, which we are now in a position to present. 
 
4.3.2 Experiment 1 - Determining the frequency band for watermarking 
This experiment is to determine the best frequency band to place the watermarks in an 
image, with the highest level of accuracy for face recognition, as well as the highest level of 
accuracy for watermark detection and recognition. 
4.3.2.1 Implementation 
The experiment is conducted with a set of face images of forty persons, with ten 
different facial expressions for each person. As such, four hundred face images are used in 
this experiment for each frequency band. In this experiment, the Matlab tool is selected to 
carry out the watermarking process (embedding and detecting the watermark) as well as for 
the face recognition process where PCA is used as the face recognition algorithm to 
measure the accuracy rate. The detailed steps are as follows: 
 101 
 
i. Every face image is embedded with the watermark in the low frequency band area. 
ii. The watermarked face images are tested in the system to measure the face 
recognition accuracy rate as well as the watermark detection rate. 
iii. The strength value of the watermark is increased slowly to find out at which level 
the accuracy and detection rate begins to deteriorate. 
iv. Repeat step i with the middle and high frequency band areas. 
 
4.3.2.2 Results 
a) Accuracy - Maintaining the accuracy of face recognition with high watermark strengths 
It is essential to investigate which frequency band has the least effect on the face 
recognition rate due to the embedded watermark. The results show that, as the strength 
value of the watermark increases, the face recognition rate for the middle frequency bands 
starts to decrease first, followed by the low bands and finally the high bands.   
 
Strength 
Value 
(Modulus) 300 900 1500 2100 2700 3000 3300 3600 3900 4200 4500 
Low 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.48 98.70 
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Middle 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.74 99.74 98.96 98.70 
High 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.74 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Face recognition accuracy rate comparison with each DCT frequency band 
under different strength value 
 
 
Figure 4.9 above shows the performance for the face recognition rate for each DCT 
frequency band. The underlying idea is to select the maximum strength value for the 
watermark where the face recognition still has 100% accuracy for feature extraction. 
Referring to Figure 4.9, the recognition rate begins to decrease around the strength value of 
4200. Therefore, it can be summarized that the high frequency band is the best location to 
maximise the watermark strength while maintaining the face recognition rate.  
Figure 4.10 shows the quality of the face image after embedding the watermark with 
different watermark strengths. It can be seen that at a very high watermark strength of 
4200, where the recognition rate is still maintained at 100%, perceptibility is still quite high 
even with the naked eye. 
   
 
SV = 3300 SV = 3600 SV = 3900 SV = 4200 
 
Figure 4.10: The quality of the face image for different watermark strength values 
b) Detection - existence of watermark for acceptance or rejection  
At the same time, it is also crucial to look at the watermark detection rate on each 
frequency band to balance with the face recognition rate. The proposed scheme not only 
needs to have a high face recognition rate but also a high watermark detection rate, with or 
without intruder attacks. The detection rate is measured using the Normalized Correlation 
(NC) score. 
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The previous experiment (a) showed that a 100% face recognition rate can still be 
maintained up to a certain watermark strength value for each frequency band. This 
experiment looks at the watermark detection rates up to those specific values. From the 
results (see Table 4.3), it can be concluded that the watermark detection rate can be 
maintained at a high level on the low frequency band as the watermark strength value 
increases. In general, it is universally recognized that a watermark detection rate of over the 
threshold value of 0.75 is considered acceptable, as at such rates the watermark can still be 
fully recovered (Al-Haj, 2007). 
Table 4.3: Detection rate for different frequency band 
 Detection rate (NC) 
Watermark Strength 
(R) 
Low Freq. Middle Freq. High 
Freq. 
300 1 1 1 
600 1 1 1 
900 1 1 1 
1200 1 1 0.99 
1500 1 0.99 0.98 
1800 0.99 0.98 0.97 
2100 0.99 0.97 0.96 
2400 0.98 0.96 0.95 
2700 0.97 0.94 0.94 
3000 0.97 0.93 0.94 
3300 0.97 0.92 0.94 
3600 0.97 0.91 0.94 
3900 0.97 0.91 0.94 
 
The comparisons for face recognition and watermark detection rates for each frequency 
band are then compiled in Figures 4.11 to 4.13 in order to help determine which frequency 
band should be finally selected for watermark embedding.  
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of face recognition and watermark detection rates for watermarks 
embedded in the low frequency bands 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Comparison of face recognition and watermark detection rates for watermarks 
embedded in the middle frequency bands 
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Figure 4.13: Comparison of face recognition and watermark detection rates for watermarks 
embedded in the high frequency bands 
 
4.3.2.3 Discussion 
From the first experiment (a), it is found that the face recognition rate performs better in 
the high frequency band, whereas the second experiment shows that the low frequency 
band outperform the higher band on the watermark detection rate. 
From the Figures 4.11 to 4.13, it can be seen that all watermark detection rates are above 
the threshold value of 0.75 in all frequency bands. However, both face recognition and 
watermark detection rates are mostly maintained at high levels in the low frequency bands. 
This then leads to the conclusion that the low frequency bands are the most suitable for 
watermark embedding.  
The watermark strength value for the last point of the highest recognition rate (100%) in 
the low frequency bands is then selected for the evaluation of the robustness value of the 
proposed scheme – which turns out to be 3900. 
 
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
R
e
co
gn
it
io
n
 /
 D
e
te
ct
io
n
 
Watermark Strength (R) 
Face Recognition
Watermark Detection
 106 
 
4.3.3 Experiment 2 – Non degradation of PCA and DCT due to the combination 
This experiment is to validate the claim that the use of DCT will not degrade PCA-based 
face recognition, and vice versa. 
Recall the explanation given earlier in 4.2.2 and Figure 4.1 with path 1 and path 2. The 
analytical result validated by experiment as presented by Weilong Chen, Meng Joo Er, and 
Shiqian Wu (2005) as shown by path 1 will have the experiment repeated here. The other 
part of the experiment is the application of DCT following an application of PCA, i.e. path 
2, in an effort to show that PCA also does not degrade the accuracy of DCT. 
The experiment is carried out for both paths with the same input images, with a hope to 
show that the results are identical with the input images. Should this be the case, given that 
PCA has been shown not to degrade DCT (Path 1), identical results from Path 2 would 
indicate that DCT also does not degrade PCA.  
Recall that both paths result in essentially compressed coefficient files. For Path 1, 
the DCT produces frequencies, which are then compressed by the DCT (Compressed 
Frequency 1). For Path 2, the PCA compresses the image file, and the DCT produces the 
frequencies of the compressed file (Compressed Frequency 2). These two files at face value 
are quite different, but equality may be shown by reconverting the files resulting from both 
paths into pixel files and then both are compared to the respective original input images. 
For the comparison, the structural similarity (SSIM) index is used, and recall that the closer 
the value is to 1, the closer are the compared images. 
4.3.3.1 Implementation 
The experiment is conducted with a set of face images of forty different persons. The 
experiment first validates path 1, by showing that the output pixel files are identical to the 
input images, i.e. with an SSIM index of 1. This is then followed by comparing the results 
of path 2 with the input images, with the hope of similar results. 
For PCA in the experiment, 20 principal components are used. In path 1, the face image 
is first converted into the frequency domain using DCT, after which the DCT coefficients 
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are compressed using PCA. The compressed DCT coefficients are then reconstructed back 
into a pixel file using the Inverse DCT (IDCT) technique (Gonzalez and Woods, 2002). As 
for path 2, the face image is first compressed using PCA, after which the compressed face 
image is then converted into the DCT frequency domain and then reconstructed back into a 
pixel file using IDCT. 
4.3.3.2 Results  
The SSIM index measurements for the similarity values between the original face 
images and the output pixel files for path 1 and path 2 are as given in the table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4: The SSIM index measurements for Path 1 and Path 2 
 SSIM 
Face images Path 1 Path 2 
Person 1 1 0.9216 
Person 2 1 0.8692 
Person 3 1 0.9543 
Person 4 1 0.8950 
Person 5 1 0.9387 
Person 6 1 0.8938 
Person 7 1 0.8936 
Person 8 1 0.9518 
Person 9 1 0.9290 
Person 10 1 0.9216 
Person 11 1 0.8798 
Person 12 1 0.9402 
Person 13 1 0.9089 
Person 14 1 0.8717 
Person 15 1 0.8670 
Person 16 1 0.8730 
Person 17 1 0.9053 
Person 18 1 0.9111 
Person 19 1 0.9320 
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Person 20 1 0.9006 
Person 21 1 0.9287 
Person 22 1 0.8929 
Person 23 1 0.9383 
Person 24 1 0.9016 
Person 25 1 0.9295 
Person 26 1 0.9311 
Person 27 1 0.8818 
Person 28 1 0.9044 
Person 29 1 0.9307 
Person 30 1 0.9221 
Person 31 1 0.9113 
Person 32 1 0.8732 
Person 33 1 0.9223 
Person 34 1 0.8687 
Person 35 1 0.9397 
Person 36 1 0.8658 
Person 37 1 0.8655 
Person 38 1 0.9131 
Person 39 1 0.9420 
Person 40 1 0.9107 
 
4.3.3.3 Discussion 
The results above show that for path 1 the compressed face images are exactly the same 
(identical) to the respective original face images, as stipulated by Weilong, Meng and 
Shiqian (2005).  
As for path 2, the compressed face images have different SSIM values, but are all very 
close to 1. This shows that there is some disturbance in the quality compared with the 
original face images. As mentioned in 4.2.2, the SSIM threshold value of 0.85 is considered 
acceptable, which is the case here. [Note: Admittedly, this threshold value of 0.85 is 
essentially a conjecture. Further experiments will have to be conducted to ascertain the 
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correct threshold value (comparable to the universally accepted watermark detection rate 
of 0.75 – see Experiment 1 above). This will be left for future work.]  
 
4.3.4 Experiment 3 - Replay attack prevention – system rejection of captured data 
This experiment is to validate the three types of rejection of resubmitted sniffed images 
(with possible modifications), captured at the positions and resubmitted at the positions as 
given in Table 4.2 earlier, with the vulnerable positions a, b, c, d, e, f, g being as given in 
Figure 3.8 earlier. 
4.3.4.1 Implementation 
The experiment results will also include: Additional - Logo does not exist (at positions a, 
g). Each experiment is conducted with forty face images from ten different persons. The 
persons are randomly picked from the database mentioned earlier. Essentially, the face 
images are only selected from the set with true positive acceptance. 
We refer to Table 4.1 earlier, which provides the foundation for the validation criteria at 
each position in the system. There are three positions at which the system embeds the 
watermark – at position b (logo and timestamp), at position f (additional timestamp) and at 
position g (logo only). Recall that the purpose of embedding the watermark at these 
positions are to protect the ownership of face image (logo) as well as ensure the data 
transmitted is fresh and it is not one captured from an earlier session and then resubmitted 
back into the system (timestamp).  
The watermarked face image may be captured at positions b, f and g only, and then 
resubmitted back at positions a and b only (there is nothing to be gained from resubmitting 
at f or g).  
— At position a, a mechanism in the sensor module can detect the presence of the logo 
watermark in the face image. If the mechanism is able to extract the logo from the face 
image, the current transaction is immediately rejected as it shows that the face image 
belongs to this system and has been processed earlier.  
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— As for resubmission at position b, the watermark timestamp (the time the face image 
leaves from position a) is used to check against the current time the image arrives at 
position c. If the embedded timestamp has lapsed the current time considerably, the 
current transaction is rejected, as it shows that the face image must have been a 
resubmission back into the system from an earlier session. 
The other positions where biometric data may be captured from are at positions c, d and 
e. However, the data there are feature values and thus can only be resubmitted back at 
positions c and d (again there is nothing to be gained from resubmitting at e). In this 
scenario, the timestamp originally embedded at position a would now be part of the feature 
values of the subject data and can be compared at position d (matching module) with the 
timestamp features coming from the object database, based on the face recognition system 
itself. A subject data containing the timestamp from an earlier session would not match 
with the object data containing the timestamp from the current session. The current 
transaction will then be rejected. Notice here that watermark extraction is not necessary at 
both positions c and d, as the validation is done by the matcher module of the face 
recognition system. 
 
4.3.4.2 Results 
From the experiment, the results are as follows. 
a) Rejection 1 - Illegitimate presence of logo (at point a) 
Rejection at point a is based on the presence of a logo within the submitted image. 
Table 4.5: Rejected status on Illegitimate presence of logo (at point a) 
Watermarked face images Stolen at Reinsertion at Rejection at Rejected 
Person 1 b a a Yes 
Person 2 b a a Yes 
Person 3 b a a Yes 
Person 4 b a a Yes 
Person 5 b a a Yes 
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Person 6 b a a Yes 
Person 7 b a a Yes 
Person 8 b a a Yes 
Person 9 b a a Yes 
Person 10 b a a Yes 
Person 1 f a a Yes 
Person 2 f a a Yes 
Person 3 f a a Yes 
Person 4 f a a Yes 
Person 5 f a a Yes 
Person 6 f a a Yes 
Person 7 f a a Yes 
Person 8 f a a Yes 
Person 9 f a a Yes 
Person 10 f a a Yes 
Person 1 g a a Yes 
Person 2 g a a Yes 
Person 3 g a a Yes 
Person 4 g a a Yes 
Person 5 g a a Yes 
Person 6 g a a Yes 
Person 7 g a a Yes 
Person 8 g a a Yes 
Person 9 g a a Yes 
Person 10 g a a Yes 
 
 
b) Rejection 2 - Timestamp does not tally (at point b) 
Rejection at point b is based on the value of the timestamp not within the acceptable range 
of the current time. 
Table 4.6: Rejected status on Timestamp does not tally (at point b) 
Watermarked face images Stolen at Reinsertion at Rejection at Rejected 
Person 1 b b b Yes 
Person 2 b b b Yes 
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Person 3 b b b Yes 
Person 4 b b b Yes 
Person 5 b b b Yes 
Person 6 b b b Yes 
Person 7 b b b Yes 
Person 8 b b b Yes 
Person 9 b b b Yes 
Person 10 b b b Yes 
Person 1 f b b Yes 
Person 2 f b b Yes 
Person 3 f b b Yes 
Person 4 f b b Yes 
Person 5 f b b Yes 
Person 6 f b b Yes 
Person 7 f b b Yes 
Person 8 f b b Yes 
Person 9 f b b Yes 
Person 10 f b b Yes 
Person 1 g b b Yes 
Person 2 g b b Yes 
Person 3 g b b Yes 
Person 4 g b b Yes 
Person 5 g b b Yes 
Person 6 g b b Yes 
Person 7 g b b Yes 
Person 8 g b b Yes 
Person 9 g b b Yes 
Person 10 g b b Yes 
 
 
c) Rejection 3 - Feature values do not match (at point d) 
Rejection at point d is done by the face recognition Matcher, also based on the 
features converted from the timestamp in the submitted image which do not match with the 
features converted from the timestamp converted from the image coming from the object 
database. 
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Table 4.7: Rejected status on Feature values do not match (at point d)  
Watermarked face images Stolen at Reinsertion at Rejection at Rejected 
Person 1 c c d Yes 
Person 2 c c d Yes 
Person 3 c c d Yes 
Person 4 c c d Yes 
Person 5 c c d Yes 
Person 6 c c d Yes 
Person 7 c c d Yes 
Person 8 c c d Yes 
Person 9 c c d Yes 
Person 10 c c d Yes 
Person 1 c d d Yes 
Person 2 c d d Yes 
Person 3 c d d Yes 
Person 4 c d d Yes 
Person 5 c d d Yes 
Person 6 c d d Yes 
Person 7 c d d Yes 
Person 8 c d d Yes 
Person 9 c d d Yes 
Person 10 c d d Yes 
Person 1 d c d Yes 
Person 2 d c d Yes 
Person 3 d c d Yes 
Person 4 d c d Yes 
Person 5 d c d Yes 
Person 6 d c d Yes 
Person 7 d c d Yes 
Person 8 d c d Yes 
Person 9 d c d Yes 
Person 10 d c d Yes 
Person 1 d d d Yes 
Person 2 d d d Yes 
Person 3 d d d Yes 
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Person 4 d d d Yes 
Person 5 d d d Yes 
Person 6 d d d Yes 
Person 7 d d d Yes 
Person 8 d d d Yes 
Person 9 d d d Yes 
Person 10 d d d Yes 
Person 1 e c d Yes 
Person 2 e c d Yes 
Person 3 e c d Yes 
Person 4 e c d Yes 
Person 5 e c d Yes 
Person 6 e c d Yes 
Person 7 e c d Yes 
Person 8 e c d Yes 
Person 9 e c d Yes 
Person 10 e c d Yes 
Person 1 e d d Yes 
Person 2 e d d Yes 
Person 3 e d d Yes 
Person 4 e d d Yes 
Person 5 e d d Yes 
Person 6 e d d Yes 
Person 7 e d d Yes 
Person 8 e d d Yes 
Person 9 e d d Yes 
Person 10 e d d Yes 
 
 
d) Additional - Logo does not exist (at points a, g) 
Rejection at point a is based on the existence of a logo, while rejection at point g is when 
the logo does not exist. 
Table 4.8: Rejected status on Logo does not exist (at points a, g) 
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Attackers face images Reinsertion at Rejection at Rejected 
Person 1 a a Yes 
Person 2 a a Yes 
Person 3 a a Yes 
Person 4 a a Yes 
Person 5 a a Yes 
Person 6 a a Yes 
Person 7 a a Yes 
Person 8 a a Yes 
Person 9 a a Yes 
Person 10 a a Yes 
Person 1 g g Yes 
Person 2 g g Yes 
Person 3 g g Yes 
Person 4 g g Yes 
Person 5 g g Yes 
Person 6 g g Yes 
Person 7 g g Yes 
Person 8 g g Yes 
Person 9 g g Yes 
Person 10 g g Yes 
 
 
4.3.4.3 Discussion 
The results clearly fully validate the claims made. 
 
4.3.5 Experiment 4 - Robustness of the watermark scheme 
This experiment is to determine the level of robustness of the watermark scheme. The 
robustness of the watermark scheme needs to be investigated to ensure that the watermark 
cannot be easily removed by an attacker. 
4.3.5.1 Implementation 
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From the results of Experiment 1, the lower frequency bands are chosen for watermark 
embedding, and the selected strength value for the watermark is 3900. For these chosen 
frequency bands and the watermark strength, this experiment is conducted with the same 
four hundred watermarked face images used for Experiment 1. Each watermarked face 
image is disturbed with various signal processing attacks (median filter, Gaussian noise, 
salt and pepper, JPEG compression) using the Matlab tool, after which the watermark is 
extracted to evaluate the quality preservation performance. The extracted watermark is 
compared with the original watermark, also using the Normalized Correlation (NC) score.  
 
4.3.5.2 Results 
Table 4.9 gives the experiment results for robustness, followed by some details. 
Table 4.9: Detection Rate after Attacks  
Attack Type Detection Rate (NC) 
Median Filter (3x3) 0.935682 
Median Filter (5x5) 0.927467 
Median Filter (7x7) 0.857539 
Median Filter (9x9) 0.694807 
Median Filter (15x15) 0.629405 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.01) 0.907509 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.05) 0.891861 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.1) 0.886505 
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 0.967328 
Gaussian Noise (0.02,0) 0.968085 
Gaussian Noise (0.1,0) 0.973004 
Gaussian Noise (0.05,0) 0.970751 
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 0.963221 
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 0.960227 
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 0.940843 
Salt&Pepper (0.05) 0.904951 
Salt&Pepper (0.1) 0.893861 
JPEG compression (10%) 0.807241 
JPEG compression (30%) 0.883940 
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JPEG compression (50%) 0.914256 
JPEG compression (70%) 0.938168 
JPEG compression (90%) 0.959181 
a) Median Filter attack 
 
Figure 4.14: Detection rate after Median Filter attacks 
 
     
Median (3x3) Median (5x5) Median (7x7) Median (9x9) Median (15x15) 
Figure 4.15: Quality of watermark image after Median Filter attacks 
As investigated, the median filter has given some trouble to the watermark detection rate 
of the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme. Figure 4.14 shows that as the 
number of median filter value increases, the watermark detection rate decreases. It can be 
clearly seen that the embedded watermark can barely survive a median filter attack value of 
(9x9). Therefore it can be concluded that the DCT watermarking technique is only fairly 
resilient against median filter attacks. 
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b) Gaussian Noise attack 
 
Figure 4.16: Detection rate after Gaussian Noise attacks 
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Figure 4.17: Quality of watermark image after Gaussian Noise attacks 
 
Figure 4.16 above shows that the watermark detection rate decreases gently as we 
increase the value of the Gaussian Noise attack. The quality of the embedded watermark 
also can be seen to be barely disturbed as we can see that the watermark is almost fully 
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preserved. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed watermarked face recognition 
scheme is resilient against a Gaussian Noise attack. 
c) Salt and Pepper attack 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Detection rate after Salt and Pepper attacks 
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Figure 4.19: Quality of watermark image after Salt and Pepper attacks 
As can be seen clearly from Figure 4.18, the watermark detection rate slowly decreases 
as the salt and pepper attack increases. This is supported by Figure 4.19, where it can be 
noted that the attacks did not really affect the watermark detection. Therefore, it can be 
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concluded that the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme is also very robust 
against salt and pepper attacks. 
 
d) JPEG Compression attack 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Detection rate after JPEG compression attacks 
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Figure 4.21: Quality of watermark image after JPEG compression attacks 
Figure 4.20 shows the detection rate on the embedded watermark after undergoing a 
JPEG compression attack. From the graph we can clearly see that the watermark detection 
rate increases as we raise the JPEG compression value on the watermarked image. It had 
been mentioned earlier in Chapter Two that according to Poljicak et al., (2011), the DCT 
approach is very robust to JPEG compression since JPEG itself makes use of DCT. This 
result shows that the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme is not only resilient to 
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a JPEG compression attack, but the JPEG compression may even increase the robustness of 
the proposed scheme. This is nothing new as Poljicak et al., (2012) had discovered that 
certain signal processing techniques could influence the watermark detection rate. 
4.3.5.3 Discussion 
From the results, it can be seen that the proposed scheme is resilient especially against 
JPEG compression, Gaussian noise, as well as salt and pepper attacks, where the embedded 
watermark is hardly disturbed from such attacks. As for the median filter attack, the 
proposed scheme is able to survive up to 7x7 filters, which indicates that it is fairly robust. 
 
4.3.6 Experiment 5 - Comparative study of watermarking techniques 
This experiment is to validate the choice of DCT as the watermarking technique to be 
coupled with DCT, by comparing it with two other most used watermarking techniques – 
namely LSB (spatial) and DWT (transform/frequency). 
As with most of the earlier experiments, this experiment is also conducted with face 
images of forty persons, each with ten different facial expressions, giving a total of four 
hundred different images. The images are embedded using the three said watermark 
techniques. The same earlier accuracy measurements for face recognition, watermark 
detection, and watermark robustness are used for this experiment. The measures are to see 
how much degradation would the watermark technique affect the PCA recognition rate in 
the three mod combinations/models: 
— Model 1: PCA-LSB 
— Model 2: PCA-DCT (our choice) 
— Model 1: PCA-DWT 
 
4.3.6.1 Implementation 
In the initial part of the experiment, the three models are evaluated based on face 
recognition accuracy as well as watermark robustness against signal processing attacks, 
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essentially by adding noises, some effects of which are illustrated in Figure 4.22. This 
experiment is very similar to the previous experiment where the Matlab tool is chosen to 
run all the signal processing attacks. 
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Figure 4.22: Samples of various attacked images 
 
The face recognition rate is measured using the PCA algorithm to investigate the effect 
of the watermarking. The correlation factor, as given by the following equation (Sangeeta 
and Anjali, 2010), is computed to measure the similarity between the embedded watermark 
denoted as 𝑤 and ?̂? as the extracted watermark for watermark detection. 
𝜌(𝑤, ?̂?) =
∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑤?̂?
𝑁
𝑖=1
(√∑ 𝑤𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 √∑ ?̂?𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 )
                
(16) 
 
 
 
4.3.6.2 Results 
 
Experiment A – Face recognition rate 
The experiment results are given in Table 4.10, which shows the face recognition 
verification accuracy rate of the three models when exposed to the various noise attacks. 
The results show that all the models produce high recognition rates with little difference 
amongst them under normal circumstances when no attacks are taking place. Nonetheless, 
Model 2 (PCA-DCT) still has the best recognition rate at 98.91 %.  
When under attack, the results show that the recognition rate slightly decreases for all 
the models except for under the Gaussian Noise (0.01.0) attack, where all the recognition 
rates drop tremendously. This is obviously because the face image cannot be recognized 
anymore as the attack is simply too heavy and has destroyed the image. In the rest of the 
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table, it can be seen that, overall, Model 2 has better results when compared with the two 
models. 
Table 4.10: Face recognition rate comparison for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various 
attacks 
Attack 
Model 1 
 (PCA + LSB) 
Model 2 
 (PCA + DCT) 
Model 3 
 (PCA + DWT) 
No attack 98.74 98.91 98.79 
Median Filter (3x3) 95.96 96.24 95.94 
Median Filter (5x5) 84.87 85.27 84.75 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.001) 98.32 98.48 98.66 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.002) 97.95 98.62 98.47 
Gaussian Noise (0.001,0) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
Gaussian Noise (0.005,0) 88.41 90.76 88.72 
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 19.84 26.49 20.68 
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 98.58 98.78 98.68 
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 98.37 98.62 98.45 
Salt&Pepper (0.005) 97.72 98.03 98.08 
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 96.16 96.57 95.78 
JPEG compression (10%) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
JPEG compression (30%) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
JPEG compression (50%) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
JPEG compression (70%) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
JPEG compression (90%) 98.74 98.91 98.79 
 
 
Experiment B - Watermark detection (Robustness) 
In this part of the experiment, the robustness of the three models is measured to find out 
the immunity of the watermark against attempts to remove or degrade unintentionally, with 
the same types of digital processing attacks. Table 4.11 gives the results, showing clearly 
that Model 2 outperforms the other models. [Note also here that the detection rate of 0.75 
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and above is considered acceptable, as the watermark can still be fully recovered (Al-Haj, 
2007).] 
Table 4.11: Watermark detection rate comparison for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various 
attacks 
Attack 
Model 1 
 (PCA + LSB) 
Model 2 
 (PCA + DCT) 
Model 3 
 (PCA + DWT) 
No attack 0.72 0.97 0.64 
Median Filter (3x3) 0.71 0.74 0.56 
Median Filter (5x5) 0.71 0.59 0.56 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.001) 0.56 0.69 0.54 
Gaussian Noise (0,0.002) 0.56 0.63 0.55 
Gaussian Noise (0.001,0) 0.72 0.97 0.51 
Gaussian Noise (0.005,0) 0.41 0.95 0.51 
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 0.42 0.97 0.51 
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 0.72 0.94 0.57 
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 0.72 0.89 0.54 
Salt&Pepper (0.005) 0.72 0.80 0.51 
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 0.72 0.69 0.51 
JPEG compression (10%) 0.72 0.55 0.56 
JPEG compression (30%) 0.72 0.61 0.55 
JPEG compression (50%) 0.72 0.70 0.54 
JPEG compression (70%) 0.72 0.79 0.55 
JPEG compression (90%) 0.72 0.95 0.54 
 
The results from Tables 4.10 and 4.11 can be re-represented as in the following Figures 
4.23 and 4.24 for a better presentation to compare the performance of the three models. 
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Figure 4.23: Face recognition rate comparison with methods of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 
under various attacks 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Watermark detection rate comparison with methods of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 
under various attacks 
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4.3.6.3 Discussion 
It can be clearly noted from the results above that the PCA-DCT combination (Model 2) 
outperforms the other two combinations, especially in terms of resilience against 
watermarking attacks. Analysing further, we would see that DCT performs better than 
DWT under frequency transform attacks. This shows that even though DWT is believed to 
have more accurate model features of HVS than DCT, it is found to be not robust against 
attacks (especially under JPEG compression attacks), and thus the adoption of DWT as a 
watermarking technique to protect the security of biometric systems is not recommended. 
In conclusion, the results from the above show that the PCA-DCT combination (Model 
2) is the best combination amongst the three for the watermarked face recognition scheme, 
showing both high recognition and watermark detection rates as well as robustness against 
various attacks. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the five experiments in an effort to validate the claims made 
there, namely (1) Determining the frequency band for watermarking, (2) Non degradation 
of PCA and DCT due to the combination, (3) Replay attack prevention – system rejection 
of captured data. (4) Robustness of the watermark scheme, and (5) Comparative study of 
watermarking techniques. 
The results for experiment in (1) indicated that the best frequency for watermark 
embedding is in the low frequency band at 3,900, which maintains the recognition rate at 
100% with the highest robustness value for the watermark, with the robustness being 
confirmed by (4). The results for (2) confirmed the full non-degradation for PCA after 
DCT, and with acceptable minor degradation for DCT after PCA, while (3) confirmed full 
protection against captured biometric data at the 28 situations under investigation. The 
experiment in (5) then confirms the best choice of PCA-DCT when compared with PCA-
LSB and PCA-DWT. 
Further research to improve the scheme by targeting other security issues is outlined in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Summary  
The research began with an analysis of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face 
recognition systems, and in particular with reference to the 8 positions of threats that have 
been listed out by Ratha et al., (2001), followed by a study of biometric watermarking 
algorithms proposed by previous researchers within the face recognition environment and 
these are classified according to their proposed solutions to the said threats. 
The above had given a good idea towards proposing a watermarked face recognition 
scheme to enhance the security of face recognition systems, especially in terms of the 
authenticity of the data being transmitted. This watermarked face recognition scheme is the 
main objective. 
For an implementation to validate the proposed scheme, the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) algorithm, the most popular holistic approach for face recognition, is 
singled out with the reasons backing the choice. For the watermarking techniques, the Least 
Significant Bits (LSB), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), and Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) techniques, being representative of their respective approaches, are 
looked at to complement the PCA to enhance its level of security. An analysis shows that 
the DCT would probably perform the best, and a further analysis is carried out to ensure 
that the PCA—DCT combination will not degrade the performance of the individual 
systems. 
The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme is then worked into the PCA—DCT 
combination, followed by a check on the 8 vulnerable positions (refer to Figure 1.1) where 
data may be intercepted and/or resubmitted to ensure the authenticity of the data being 
transmitted. Within the 64 (8x8) vulnerable positions, some are found to be not relevant, 
some are shown to be resolved (fully-protected), while the (few) remaining ones are left for 
future work. 
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Five experiments are conducted to validate the claims made in this research, which all 
proved successful: 
1) Determining the frequency band for watermarking  
2) Non-degradation of PCA and DCT due to the combination 
3) Replay attack prevention – system rejection of captured data 
a) Illegitimate presence of watermarks (logo) 
b) Timestamp does not tally 
c) Value of features do not match (based on the face recognition system) 
4) Robustness of the watermarking scheme 
5) Comparative study of watermarking techniques 
Experiment 1 is a pre-requisite for all the other experiments; experiment 2 is towards 
non-degradation, supported by experiment 5, as the claim also includes a proposal for a 
secure face recognition algorithm and watermarking technique combination. Experiment 3 
is for the main objective, while experiment 4 is for computing robustness of the proposed 
watermarked face recognition scheme. 
 
5.2 Contributions 
While biometric techniques often offer reliable identification mechanisms, the problem 
of authenticity and integrity of the biometric data poses new issues. One fundamental 
advantage in biometric techniques is that biometric traits are irreplaceable as compared to 
passwords, locks or cards. A copy of biometric data will look identical to the original one. 
However, biometrics-based verification systems can only be trusted if the verifier system 
can guarantee that the biometric data came from the same legitimate person as the one at 
the time of enrolment. Watermarking on biometric data can fill this gap by ensuring the 
ownership of the said data. There is not much research done in combining the two 
technologies and there is indeed a need for more research to explore this idea further more 
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as the impact of this research will not only contribute to the security problem in biometric 
techniques but also to digital image processing in general.  
This research contributes to a study on the combination of face recognition algorithm 
and watermarking techniques to enhance the security of face recognition systems. The main 
contributions are the following: 
1) The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme of a suitable combination of a 
face recognition algorithm and a watermarking technique, namely the PCA-DCT 
combination, where the combination is shown not to degrade the performance of the 
individual systems.  
2) The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme that will ensure the authenticity 
of the transmitted data in the face recognition system, in particular at the 8 vulnerable 
positions where data may be intercepted and/or resubmitted, and in doing so will 
enhance the level of security of the face recognition system (refer to Figure 3.8), 
3) The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, as required by any watermarking 
technique, is shown to be robust against signal processing attacks and in particular that 
the watermark cannot be easily removed by an attacker. 
 
Within the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, a logo and a timestamp are 
embedded as watermarks. The logo serves as identification if the face image is captured. 
The timestamp is the main security enhancer, which works essentially as a session ID, 
where a face image or feature set captured from within the process and then resubmitted 
back to the system will be immediately recognised as coming from a different session and 
will be rejected.  
With positions a and h being not within the scope of this research, and that positions e, f 
,g, h being not relevant for resubmissions, the remaining 7x4 = 28 situations have been 
found to be fully secured. This means that within the 8x8 = 64 total vulnerable situations: 
— 7x4 = 28 are fully covered with this proposal 
— 7x4 = 28 are irrelevant 
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— 1x8 = 8 are left for future work (position h) 
5.3 Future work 
We conclude this thesis by elaborating on possible research directions that can be used 
to expand the research presented here. In general, the suggested future work would pertain 
to one of the three following areas: 
 Components of the current work that can be complemented 
 Extensions of the current work 
 Applications of the results in the current work in other areas. 
5.3.1 Complementing current work 
1) Presenting a printed image to the scanner (Position a) 
A fresh image is shown to the scanner (camera), possibly a picture of an authorised 
person. In this situation, the scanner has to recognise that it is a printed image, and not that 
of a physical person. There is a need for a good method for this, but in the meantime, 
CCTVs may be deployed to monitor such a situation. Further enhancement to the face 
recognition system such as a deployment of a face liveness detection mechanism in order to 
guard against such spoofing could be considered. 
2) Captured image captured at the scanner 
Images can be captured from the scanner (position a) before the watermark is embedded. 
The images are then printed, and placed in front of the scanner. This can happen if the 
scanner is stored with a temporary memory, which can and perhaps should be removed. In 
any case, this situation is similar to the above (fresh image). 
3) Non-degradation of face recognition performance 
Analytical results validated by experiments as presented by Weilong, Meng and Shiqian 
(2005) have shown that DCT does not degrade the performance of PCA, at least in terms of 
the accuracy of face recognition when DCT is first applied on a pixel file to obtain a 
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frequency domain file (with changes in coefficients), and then followed by the application 
of PCA for compression as well as reconverting to an image (compressed file). The result is 
the same as that of a direct application of PCA on the original pixel file. 
Ideally, we would want to have the same analytical results both ways, namely also for 
the application of DCT following an application of PCA which would then show that PCA 
also does not degrade the accuracy of DCT. This analytical result is definitely an area for 
future work. 
However, as mentioned, proving this result is beyond the scope of this thesis, therefore 
experiments were conducted to show some form of validation of this result. Even in the 
experiments, which used the SSIM index to measure the similarity values (where the value 
1 would indicate identical), the threshold value of 0.85 was considered reasonable. Further 
experiments will have to be conducted to ascertain the correct threshold value (comparable 
to the universally accepted watermark detection rate of 0.75). 
5.3.2 Future further improvements 
1) Further research may explore others combination of face recognition algorithms within 
the holistic approaches, such as LDA (Linear Discriminant Analysis) or ICA (Independent 
Component Analysis), with watermarking techniques. PCA deals with the data as a whole 
as it tries to characterize variability in the data set without taking into account class 
membership of the data. LDA on the hand tries to take into account as much as possible the 
class discriminatory information (Putte et al., 2000). A new technique of ICA has been 
reported to improve and in many cases exceed the performance of PCA or LDA recognition 
based systems. Future work should therefore focus on the investigation of achieving the 
best face recognition accuracy rate from other holistic based algorithms.  
2) The need of more robust watermarking schemes is required to survive watermarking 
attacks. Robustness has become one of the key properties in watermarking techniques. As a 
further extension to this research, in order to develop a much more robust watermarking 
scheme, other signal processing attacks such as histogram equalization and stretching, 
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dithering and resizing, should be considered in testing the robustness of the proposed 
schemes. 
5.3.3 Applications in other domains 
1) Further investigation and experimentation into combination of other biometric 
techniques (e.g. fingerprint, iris) using holistic approaches as the recognition algorithms 
and combined with watermarking techniques is strongly recommended. A number of 
possible future studies using the same experimental set up are possible. It would be 
interesting to assess the effects of biometric recognition accuracy due to the embedding 
watermark technique as well as the robustness of the watermarked biometric recognition 
scheme.  
 
2) The use of 3D based face recognition techniques as well as the use of other sensors 
instead of video cameras may also be considered. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The contributions from this research constitute a solution step to the security problems 
associated with biometric authentication systems and to the area of digital image 
processing. In addition, it is hoped that the outcome of this research will stimulate further 
research by opening up more research gaps in the area of combining biometric and 
watermarking techniques.  
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Appendix A -  List of watermarking techniques on biometrics and their application domains 
 
No. Authors Research Title Year Cover 
Image 
Watermark 
data 
Algorithm Watermarking 
techniques 
Application Comments 
1 Behera, 
Govindan 
Improved 
multimodal 
biometric 
watermarking 
in 
authentication 
systems based 
on DCT and 
phase 
congruency 
model 
2013 Face Fingerprint, 
Demographic 
data 
DCT, PSO Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
No face 
detection 
module 
2 Bedi et al., Multimodal 
biometric 
authentication 
using PSO 
based 
watermarking 
2012 Face Fingerprint DCT, PSO Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
No face 
detection 
module 
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3 Zutao Zhang Improving 
security for 
facial image 
using fragile 
digital 
watermarking, 
face analysis, 
modelling and 
recognition 
systems 
2011 Face Watermark 
scrambled by 
chaotic 
systems 
LSB Fragile Image 
Tampering  
Facial image 
database 
4 Ma et al., Block pyramid 
based adaptive 
quantization 
watermarking 
for multimodal 
biometric 
authentication 
2010 Face Fingerprint QIM, 
Adaboost 
region 
selection 
Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
Imperceptibility 
of face image is 
not important 
as long as the 
face feature can 
be extracted 
5 Li et al., Protecting 
biometric 
templates using 
authentication 
watermarking 
2010 Face Eigenvalue 
face 
information 
Salient 
region based 
Semi Fragile Biometric 
template 
protection,  
Image 
Tampering 
Facial image 
database 
6 Yan and Liu An information 
hiding 
algorithm 
based on 
RDWT for 
fingerprint 
biometric 
system 
2010 Face Fingerprint RDWT Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
Imperceptibility 
of face image is 
not important 
as long as the 
face feature can 
be extracted 
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7 Hoang et al., Remote 
multimodal 
biometric 
authentication 
using bit 
priority-based 
fragile 
watermarking 
2008 Face Fingerprint Amplitude 
modulation, 
priority level 
of bits 
sequence 
Fragile Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
No face 
detection 
module 
8 Hoang et al., Remote 
multimodal 
biometric 
authentication 
using bit 
priority-based 
fragile 
watermarking 
2008 Face Fingerprint Amplitude 
modulation, 
priority level 
of bits 
sequence 
Fragile Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
No face 
detection 
module 
9 Salahi et al., A new visually 
imperceptible 
and robust 
watermarking 
scheme in 
Contourlet 
Domain 
2008 Face Logo CT Robust Biometric data 
protection 
No face 
detection 
module 
10 Vatsa et al., Feature based 
RDWT 
watermarking 
for multimodal 
biometric 
system 
2007 Face Voice RDWT Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
Imperceptibility 
of face image is 
not important 
as long as the 
face feature can 
be extracted 
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11 Park et al., A study on Iris 
feature 
watermarking 
on face data 
2007 Face Iris Transform 
domain, 
Adaboost 
region 
selection 
Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
Imperceptibility 
of face image is 
not important 
as long as the 
face feature can 
be extracted 
12 Vatsa et al., Digital 
watermarking 
based secure 
multimedia 
biometric 
system 
2004 Face Iris template Modified 
Correlation, 
Modified 2D 
DCT 
Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
No face 
detection 
module 
13 Chung et al., Hiding 
biometric data 
for secure 
transmission 
2005 Fingerprint, 
Face 
Fingerprint, 
Face 
Dual 
watermark 
Robust Template 
protection 
No face 
detection 
module 
14 Moon et al., Performance 
evaluation of 
watermarking 
techniques for 
secure 
multimodal 
biometric 
systems 
2005 Fingerprint, 
Face 
Fingerprint, 
Face 
Robust and 
Fragile WM 
technique 
Semi Fragile Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
No face 
detection 
module 
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15 Chen and 
Chang 
A Digital 
Watermarking 
Scheme for 
Personal Image 
Authentication 
Using 
Eigenface 
2005 Personal 
Image 
(Face) 
Eigenvalue 
face 
information 
SHA-1 
SEQUENCE, 
DCT 
Robust copyright 
protection 
Not Biometric 
Authentication 
System 
16 Tzouveli et 
al., 
Automatic 
Face Region 
Detection 
Using 
Qualified 
Significant 
Wavelet Trees 
(QSWT) 
technique 
 
2002 Real life 
images 
(Face) 
Logo QSWT, 
DWT 
Robust Copyright 
protection 
Not Biometric 
Authentication 
System 
17 Bahsal, 
Sehgal, Bedi 
Securing 
fingerprint 
images using a 
hybrid 
technique 
 
2012 Fingerprint Face Neural 
Network – 
PSO 
Robust Biometric data 
protection 
 
18 Sabu and 
Ann 
Securing 
biometric 
images using 
reversible 
watermarking 
2011 Fingerprint Text LSB, 
Different 
Expansion, 
Rotational 
Replacement 
of LSB 
Reversible 
Watermarking 
Biometric data 
protection 
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19 Yadav, Saini 
and Nandal 
Biometric 
template 
security using 
invisible 
watermarking 
with minimum 
degradation in 
quality of 
template 
2011 Fingerprint Bit ‘0’ or ‘1’ Spatial, 
Parity 
Checker 
Method 
Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
 
20 Li et al., Sparse 
reconstruction 
based 
watermarking 
for secure 
biometric 
authentication 
2011 Fingerprint,  Compact face 
feature 
Robust WM, 
Blind -
SSQIM 
Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
 
21 Y. Cao et al., Robust 
biometric 
watermarking 
based on 
Contourlet 
transform for 
fingerprint and 
face protection 
2010 Fingerprint Face CT, 
quantization 
Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
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22 Mathivadhani 
and Meena 
A comparative 
study of 
fingerprint 
protection 
using 
watermarking 
techniques 
2010 Fingerprint Pseudorandom 
sequence 
generator 
Zebbiche et 
al. algo 
(DCT, 
DWT), Vasta 
et al algo 
(DWT + 
LSB) 
Robust Biometric data 
protection 
23 Kim and Lee Multimodal 
biometric 
image 
watermarking 
using two stage 
integrity 
verification 
2009 Fingerprint Face Blind and SS 
approach 
Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
 
24 Rajibul Islam 
et al., 
A secured 
fingerprint 
authentication 
system 
2008 Fingerprint Palmprint DWT, Wu et 
al. 
 
Robust  
Biometric data 
protection 
 
25 Zebbiche et 
al., 
Region-based 
watermarking 
of biometric 
images: Case 
study in 
fingerprint 
images 
2008 Fingerprnt Pseudorandom 
sequence 
generator 
DWT, DFT Robust Biometric data 
protection 
Embed 
watermark in 
foreground or 
ridges area 
(ROI) 
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26 Zebbiche et 
al., 
An efficient 
watermarking 
technique for 
the protection 
of fingerprint 
images 
2008 Fingerprint Pseudorandom 
sequence 
generator 
DCT, DWT Robust Biometric data 
protection 
Embed 
watermark in 
foreground or 
ridges area 
(ROI) 
27 Noore et al., Enhancing 
security of 
fingerprints 
through 
contextual 
biometric 
watermarking 
2007 Fingerprint Face, 
Demographic 
text data 
DWT Semi Fragile Image 
tempering 
 
28 Zebbiche et 
al., 
Protecting 
fingerprint data 
using 
watermarking 
2006 Fingerprint Fingerprint 
minutiae 
Wavelet Robust Biometric data 
protection 
 
29 Kim et al., Secure remote 
fingerprint 
verification 
using dual 
watermarks. 
2006 Fingerprint Pseudorandom 
sequence 
generator 
Robust  
(Dugad et 
al.) and 
Fragile  (Jain 
et al. )WM 
technique 
Semi Fragile Biometric data 
protection 
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30 Vatsa et al., Robust 
biometric 
image 
watermarking 
for fingerprint 
and face 
template 
protection 
2006 Fingerprint Face template DWT, LSB Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
31 Vatsa et al., Improving 
biometric 
recognition 
accuracy and 
robustness 
using DWT 
and SVW 
watermarking 
2005 Fingerprint Face Multi 
resolution 
DWT, SVM 
Robust Image 
tampering 
 
32 Ahmed and 
Moskowitz 
Composite 
signature based 
watermarking 
for fingerprint 
authentication 
2005 Fingerprint Signature 
extracted from 
Fingerprint 
Fourier 
Frequency 
Domain 
Robust Image 
Authentication 
 
33 Giannoula 
and 
Hatzinakos 
Data hiding for 
multimodal 
biometric 
recognition 
2004 Fingerprint Voice, Iris DWT Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
 
34 Jain et al., Hiding 
fingerprint 
minutiae in 
images 
2002 Fingerprint  Face Robust WM 
technique 
Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
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35 
 
Uludag et al., 
A spatial 
method for 
watermarking 
of fingerprint 
images 
 
2001 
 
Fingerprint 
 
Watermark bit 
 
Spatial 
 
Robust 
 
Biometric data 
protection 
 
36 Ratha et al., Secure data 
hiding in 
wavelet 
compressed 
fingerprint 
images 
2000 Fingerprint - Wavelet 
compressed 
domain, 
Huffman 
algo 
Robust data 
hiding 
Data 
compression 
 
37 Yeung and 
Pankanti 
Verification 
watermarks on 
fingerprint 
recognition and 
retrieval 
1999 Fingerprint Chaotic 
mixing 
Invisible 
WM 
technique 
Fragile Image 
Verification 
 
38  
Inamdar and 
Rege 
 
Face features 
based 
biometric 
watermarking 
of digital image 
using singular 
value 
decomposition 
for 
fingerprinting 
 
2012 
 
General 
Image 
 
Face 
 
PCA, SVD 
 
Robust 
 
Fingerprinting 
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39 M. Paunwala, 
S. Patnaik 
DCT 
watermarking 
approach for 
security 
enhancement 
of multimodal 
system 
2012 General 
Image 
Iris, 
Fingerprint 
DCT Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
40 M. Qi et al., A novel image 
hiding 
approach based 
on correlation 
analysis for 
secure 
multimodal 
biometrics 
2010 General 
Image 
Palmprint, iris Correlation 
Analysis, 
Partial Least 
Squares 
(PLS), PSO 
Robust Biometric data 
protection 
 
41 George 
Varbanov 
and Peter 
Blagoev 
An improving 
model 
watermarking 
with iris 
biometric code 
2007 General 
Image 
Logo, Iris 
biometric 
code 
DWT Robust Biometric 
template 
protection 
Hashing iris 
code before 
embedding 
process 
42 Geetha et al., Geometric 
Attack 
Invariant 
watermarking 
with biometric 
data – applied 
on offline 
handwritten 
signature 
2011 Handwritten 
signature 
Face DCT, SVD Robust Ownership 
protection 
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43 Jutta 
Hammerle-
Uhl et al., 
Experimental 
Study on the 
Impact of 
Robust 
Watermarking 
on Iris 
Recognition 
Accuracy 
2010 Iris Binary values LSB, DCT, 
DWT 
Robust Biometric data 
protection 
44 Bartlow et 
al., 
Protecting iris 
images through 
asymmetric 
digital 
watermarking 
2007 Iris Voice feature 
vector 
Asymmetric  
technique 
Robust Multimodal 
Biometric 
Authentication 
 
45 Hui et al., Study on 
Implementation 
of a Fingerprint 
Watermark 
2009 Lena Image Fingerprint 
characteristics 
Spatial 
Domain, 
DCT 
Robust Copyright 
protection 
 


